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OVERSIGHT FAILURE IN SECURITIES
MARKETS
Yesha Yadav†
According to statute, securities exchanges play an
essential role in ensuring compliance with applicable laws
and industry standards. Long imagined as unique in their
institutional capacity to bring traders together, collect
information and exclude problem participants from the
marketplace, exchanges have offered an efficient source of
private discipline for public regulators.
The classic
conception of the exchange, however, no longer holds true in
today’s markets. Rather than concentrate activity within a
handful of exchanges, equity markets are fragmented across
a network of 14 exchanges and around 40 lightly regulated,
off-exchange alternative venues (colloquially, “dark pools”).
This Article shows that the goal of exchange oversight is
rendered unachievable in fragmented markets.
First,
exchanges no longer constitute the central forums for
convening traders, who now enjoy enormous choice
regarding where and how to trade. Fragmentation also
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affiliated with Nasdaq that hear appeals from companies subject to the Nasdaq
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increases the costs of performing oversight and reduces its
effectiveness.
Exchanges must work harder to collect
information across multiple exchanges and dark pools.
Tough enforcement can result in lost business. And the
power to exclude traders from the exchange is weak where
traders can move fluidly to other venues.
Secondly,
exchanges have incentives to under-invest in oversight. They
reap private gains by winning business, but share the risks
of losses with competitor exchanges and dark pools.
This Article proposes a structural solution to motivate
stronger surveillance, outlining a new liability regime for
exchanges and dark pools. Liability aligns the incentives of
trading venues towards delivering oversight. In so doing, it
helps recapture the benefits of consolidation, while
maintaining competition in market structure.
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INTRODUCTION
In December 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit delivered a ruling that caught securities
exchanges by surprise. In City of Providence v. BATS Global
Markets, Inc., the court gave a green light to plaintiff investors
seeking to move forward with their class action against some
of the nation’s best-known exchanges, including the New York
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Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Nasdaq.1 The charge in the case:
the exchanges stood accused of selling data feeds and location
rights that resulted in a select group of traders—ultra-fast,
high-frequency traders—enjoying systematically better access
to trading opportunities than others.2 As a consequence, the
plaintiffs alleged, their own ability to transact on a level playing
field was diminished, forcing them to routinely lose out to these
high-speed, high-paying traders.3
The element of surprise, however, arose less from the
allegations themselves, and more from the fact that the court
allowed the lawsuit to progress at all. It is well established that
exchanges have long benefited from a broad immunity against
suits owing to their special status as private regulators of
securities markets.4 In return for enforcing securities rules
and industry standards, regulation has insulated exchanges
expansively from the threat of expensive, investor lawsuits.5 In
this instance, the Second Circuit underscored the distinction
between the dual roles of exchanges as regulators on the one
1

2017).

City of Providence v. BATS Global Markets, Inc., 878 F. 3d 36 (2d Cir.

See id. at 42–43.
See id. For a discussion of these practices and their implications, see
generally Yesha Yadav, Insider Trading and Market Structure, 63 UCLA L. REV.
968 (2016) [hereinafter Yadav, Insider Trading].
4 See, e.g., Exchange Act § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (2000) (stipulating
requirements for any entity that seeks to become an exchange, to include, for
example, governance standards for members). For discussion see Roberta S.
Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organizations Be Considered
Government Agencies, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 151, 163–65 (2008) (examining
the history of what eventually became the Nasdaq exchange). For an excellent
comparative survey and analysis of exchanges and their regulatory function see
Stavros Gadinis & Howell E. Jackson, Markets as Regulators, 80 S. CAL. L. REV.
1239, 1244 (2007) (noting that exchanges in the eight jurisdictions surveyed
maintained some self-regulatory function and responsibility in oversight—but
with varying levels of intensity of government supervision). See also Chris J.
Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Markets for Securities Laws, 75 U. C HI.
L. REV. 1435, 1452 (2008) (“Stock exchanges are not only venues for trading; they
also help regulate the markets they organize.”).
5 See Sparta Surgical Corp. v. NASD, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1213 (9th Cir.
1998) (immunity for exchanges in their exercise of quasi-governmental power);
Barbara v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 99 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 1996) (giving
exchanges immunity for suits arising out of disciplinary proceedings). But see
Weissman v. NASD, Inc. (Weissman IV), 500 F.3d 1293, 1299 (11th Cir. 2007)
(distinguishing between acts carried out in the commercial interests of exchanges
and their regulatory power). For discussion, see Exchange Act § 6(b)(1) & (5);
Exchange Act § 15A(b)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(7) (2000); D.L. Cromwell Inv. ,
Inc. v. NASD Regulation, Inc., 279 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2002) (criminal sanction
arising from the exercise of exchange censure); Craig Springer, Weissman v.
NASD: Piercing the Veil of Absolute Immunity of an SRO under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 451 (2008).
2
3
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hand, and exchanges as for-profit, commercial entities on the
other.6 When offering proprietary products, like access to data
or to their location services, exchanges were acting in the latter
capacity and thus could not expect to be immunized against
suit.7 By highlighting the significance of these contrasting
roles, the Second Circuit pointed to the complicated place of
modern exchanges in securities regulation, relied on and
rewarded for their supervision, while still remaining deeply
beholden to the business of trading.8
This fundamental tension between an exchange’s public
function and its private interests faces a fresh challenge in
modern markets. For well over a decade, regulation has
pushed exchanges to compete in delivering trading services.
Rather than allow exchanges to extract private rents from their
position—by charging investors high fees for transactions, for
example—policy has favored requiring trading venues to
compete with one another.9 Central to achieving this aim has
been the formalizing of lightly regulated trading venues—socalled alternative trading systems (ATS) or dark pools within
the marketplace. ATS offer investors a platform to transact in
publicly-traded equity once these securities have been listed
on an exchange (notably, the NYSE or Nasdaq).10 Instead of
exchanges being solely authorized to capture all the secondary
trading in the securities they list, regulation creates a “market”
for the provision of trading services. By making exchanges and
dark pools compete to attract secondary market trades,
investors can enjoy increased choice and heightened
efficiencies in capital allocation where prices do not reflect a

6 See City of Providence v. BATS Global Markets, Inc., 878 F.3d 36, 46–48
(2d Cir. 2017).
7 See id. at 48.
8 See id. at 46–47.
9 See infra subpart II.A.
10 It should be noted that not all national exchanges list securities.
Exchanges divide into those that list securities and those that trade the securities
of companies that are listed on another exchange. The two major listing
exchanges are the NYSE and the Nasdaq. For discussion on the significance of
exchanges and their continuing role in the listing process, see Onnig
Dombalagian, Exchanges, Listless?: The Disintermediation of the Listing Function,
50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 579, 581, 587–88, 597–99 (2015). On the obligation to
execute trade at the best price, see Regulation National Market System Rule 611,
Order Protection Rule, 17 CFR 242.611 (2005). Some venues offer certain
services to attract orders to their venue. See, e.g., IEX Trading Alert 023 (Nov. 3,
2013), http://www.iextrading.com/trading/alerts/2014/023/ (last visited Sept.
21,
2019)
[https://perma.cc/5AGU-HZPW];
IEX,
About
IEX,
http://www.iextrading.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/36H3-U5GN].
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bundle of bloated transaction costs.11
Unsurprisingly, given their lower regulatory compliance
burden and no real mandate to oversee securities markets,
dark pools have succeeded in quickly capturing a large chunk
of the trading business.
In addition to 13 national
exchanges,12 stocks trades on around 40 ATS of varying sizes
and types.13 Whereas the NYSE once attracted around 80% of
trading volume in the equity it listed, its group of exchanges
11 Nathaniel Popper, As Market Heats Up, Trading Slips Into Shadows, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/01/business/asmarket-heats-up-trading-slips-into-shadows.html
[https://perma.cc/5T42NXE4] (on investors choosing to trade on dark pools because of the lower
transparency requirements); see infra subpart II.B.
On Electronic
Communication Networks within the taxonomy of ATS, see Laura Tuttle,
Alternative Trading Systems: Description of ATS Trading in National Market System
Stocks, SEC Division of Economic and Risk Analysis, 9–10 (Oct. 2013). For a
current list of exchanges authorized under Section 6 of the Securities Exchange
Act,
see
Exchanges,
SECURITIES
AND
EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrexchanges.shtml
[https://perma.cc/Q9VH-NXRX].
12 See Alternative Trading System (“ATS”) List, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
https://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/atslist.htm
[https://perma.cc/EV9F-UERX] (last updated Aug. 2019). For a list of national
exchanges currently registered with the SEC, see National Securities Exchanges,
SECURITIES
AND
EXCHANGE
C OMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/fastanswers/divisionsmarketregmrexchangesshtml.html [https://perma.cc/985MMTRF] (last updated June 21, 2019). It should be noted that, as of the time of
writing, the newest stock exchange, the Long Term Stock Exchange, has not yet
fully launched its operations. See The Long-Term Stock Exchange Receives
Approval from the Securities and Exchange Commission to Operate a National
Securities
Exchange,
THE
LONG
TERM
STOCK
EXCHANGE ,
https://longtermstockexchange.com/news/ltse-receives-approval-from-sec
[https://perma.cc/P927-7DG6] (last updated Sept. 9, 2019).
13 Determining the number of ATS is quite problematic. ATS can also include
electronic crossing networks (or ECNs) that disseminate order-related
information to their users and match buy and sell orders between their clients.
These networks thus have transparency, unlike other ATS venues that do not
have to display pre-trade price information. This Article uses the number of
platforms that report active weekly trading data to FINRA. It should be noted
that FINRA can exempt certain ATS from the reporting requirement. The number
of ATS, of varying degrees and types of trading activity, registered with the SEC
is usually larger. This number is constantly in flux. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,
ATS
LIST,
https://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/atslist.htm
[https://perma.cc/SL4Q-U7FG] (Jan 2018); FINRA, ATS TRANSPARENCY DATA,
https://ats.finra.org/TradingParticipants
[https://perma.cc/4SDM-UMQD];
FINRA, EQUITY ATS FIRMS,
http://www.finra.org/industry/equity-ats-firms
[https://perma.cc/NLU9-FU26] (Nov. 2017). For discussion, see Maureen
O’Hara & Mao Ye, Is Market Fragmentation Harming Market Quality?, 100 J. FIN.
ECON. 459, 459 (2011) (“One of the more striking changes in U.S. equity markets
has been the proliferation of trading venues.”); Sam Mamudi, Dark Pools: Private
Stock Trading vs. Public Exchanges, B LOOMBERG QUICK TAKE (Aug. 23, 2015),
http://www.bloombergview.com/quicktake/dark-pools
[https://perma.cc/7H7M-KU3H].
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now handle only around 24% of U.S. equity volume, with
Nasdaq at approximately 20%.14 Dark pools, by contrast, have
gained an increasing slice of the pie, attracting around 35% of
U.S. equity trading volume in 2019.15
This Article argues that policy’s focus on competition—and
the fragmentation that has resulted—has rendered it near
impossible for exchanges to provide effective oversight in
securities markets. It makes three contributions.
First, the Article shows that fragmentation generates
enormous logistical and institutional costs for exchanges
seeking to monitor, surveille and discipline. Exchanges work
best by convening a large number of users within their venue.16
Numbers help traders find one another and strike deals.17
They generate “network externalities,” whereby a large number
of users attracts even greater numbers owing to the benefits of

14 BATS,
VOLUME
SUMMARY,
https://www.bats.com/us/equities/market_statistics/
[https://perma.cc/7VTS-84RP] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019); NASDAQ, EQUITY
MARKET
SHARE
STATISTICS,
http://www.nasdaqtrader. com/trader. aspx?id=marketshare
[https://perma.cc/V4AM-NWDH]. For example, Nasdaq’s main equity trading
platform (the Nasdaq Stock Market) has a share of U.S. equities at around 18.2%
overall. Its share of trading securities listed on its own exchange was 28.7% and
its share of trading NYSE-listed securities was around 13.3%. Tape A measures
refer to NYSE-listed securities, Tape B to securities listed on regional exchanges
and Tape C to Nasdaq listed securities. For discussion, see BATS TRADING,
MARKET
VOLUME
SUMMARY
HELP,
https://www.batstrading.com/market_summary/help/
[https://perma.cc/5AMJ-YUL2]; see also Mark Fahey, Dark Pools Still Popular
Despite
Year
of
Regulatory
Concern,
CNBC
(Feb.
1,
2016),
https://www.cnbc.com/2016/02/01/regulators-may-dislike-dark-pools-butinvestors-love-them.html [https://perma.cc/8BJ9-VDPF].
15 BATS,
VOLUME
SUMMARY,
https://www.bats.com/us/equities/market_statistics/
[https://perma.cc/2H85-Z6KL] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019); TABB FORUM ,
EQUITIES LIQUIDITY MATRIX (Jan. 15, 2016), http://tabbforum.com/liquiditymatrix [https://perma.cc/5MVK-AE55]; TABB FORUM, EQUITIES LIQUIDITY MATRIX
(Dec. 2015) https://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/295992285?access_key=keyeD9kGCLxPJwWFCb4Fssn&allow_share=false&escape=false&show_recommend
ations=false&view_mode=slideshow [https://perma.cc/Z7HF-GSKK].
16 ALVIN ROTH, W HO GETS WHAT AND WHY? THE NEW ECONOMICS OF
MATCHMAKING AND MARKET DESIGN 8–10 (2015) (noting, generally, the need for
large numbers for a marketplace. However, Prof. Roth discusses various types
of markets depending on the kind of purpose it is designed to fulfill, e.g. organ
transplants, student-college matches etc).
17 Id. at 4–10; see also Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 4, at 1268–71 (noting
the different models of exchanges and state regulation). The Nasdaq and the
NYSE, for example, exemplify alternative models. The Nasdaq has traditionally
been a “dealer” market in which designated “dealers” for particular securities
intermediated the flow of trades.
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an active, efficient marketplace.18 From the perspective of
regulation, numbers enable exchanges to deliver efficient
oversight.19 A repeat base of users provides information; it
develops and hones an exchange’s expertise over time; and it
amplifies an exchange’s disciplinary power by giving real teeth
to its threat to exclude a user from an essential economic
resource.20
Fragmentation damages the capacity of an exchange to
conduct oversight by sharply reducing the number of users
that an exchange attracts. This dramatic thinning of the user
base harms the delivery of exchange oversight in key ways. For
a start, the logistical costs of monitoring and discipline rise
sharply. Whereas an exchange like the NYSE might once have
seen almost 80%–100% of all trading in its listed securities,
this figure now hovers around the 20% mark or less
throughout the trading day.21 An exchange must work harder
to gather information on the traders that cross its floor. Far
from simply looking within its own venue, it must monitor and
also coordinate with an ever-expanding multiplicity of lessregulated dark pools that also host trading in listed securities.
But a fragmented market structure also gives fraudsters,
insider-traders, or manipulators choice about where to
transact—on exchanges or on opaque dark pools. This can
encourage bad apples to creatively craft opportunistic,
disruptive strategies designed to avoid detection.22 Without
18 Haim Mendelson, Consolidation, Fragmentation and Market Performance,
22 J. FIN. QUANTITATIVE. ANALYSIS. 189 (1987) (observing the benefits of market
consolidation and network externalities for exchanges); Marco Pagano, Trading
Volume & Asset Liquidity, 104 Q.J. ECON. 579 (1995) (observing network
externalities with liquidity likely to flow to markets with higher degrees of
consolidation).
19 Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 4, at 1277–79; Jonathan R. Macey &
Hideki Kanda, The Stock Exchange as a Firm: The Emergence of Close Substitutes
for the New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1007, 1007–10
(1990) (analyzing the signaling function of listing and exchange regulation); Paul
G. Mahoney, Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L REV. 1453, 1459–64 (1997)
(detailing the historic evolution of exchange regulation of their members through
contract rules as well as checks on conduct and creditworthiness).
20 George Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality, Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); Harold Demsetz, The Cost of Transacting,
82 Q. J. ECON. 33 (1968); Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask and
Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders,
14 FIN. ECON. 71 (1985); Macey & Kanda, supra note 19, 1020–2l.
21 See SIFMA, SIFMA I NSIGHTS: US EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE PRIMER 12
(2018), https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/SIFMA-InsightsEMS-Primer_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/GBS4-VFBU]; see also supra note 10.
22 See Ananth Madhavan, Market Microstructure: A Survey, 3 J. FIN. MKTS.
205, 216–18 (2000) (noting finance studies that suggest that large block trades
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cooperation between platforms, an exchange will struggle to
enforce compliance with securities rules.23
Where the
information and coordination costs of enforcement are high,
exchanges will be selective about enforcement choices,
confining interventions to obvious and egregious breaches or
those whose impact will be widely felt. Critically, the impact of
exchange discipline will be weakened if traders can easily
switch business to less regulated platforms like dark pools.24
In addition, lower volumes of business—and fierce
competition between venues—deepen the conflicts of interest
inherent in the notion of for-profit exchanges disciplining those
that bring them business. As noted in City of Providence, it is
well-trodden ground that for-profit exchanges represent
somewhat problematic overseers of the market.25 Why would
any rational exchange zealously monitor, discipline and
exclude those traders that bring it the most business? How
much capital can a revenue-hungry exchange reasonably
invest in building an expensive regulatory apparatus to fulfill
a public good? Certainly, exchanges internalize private benefits
when those using their venue are well behaved. But their
efforts are designed to confer benefits to the market as a whole
beyond just their own institution.26 This core conflict has
never been satisfactorily addressed as exchanges have
continued to perform their oversight function. Fragmentation,
however, imports a particularly challenging dimension.
With fragmentation, exchanges are internalizing higher
costs of oversight while seeing less volume and reduced
revenues from trading.27 Facing competition from cheaper,
less-regulated dark pools, exchanges have to work hard to win
market share. This can lead exchanges to seek revenues more
aggressively, by selling a variety of side services (e.g. data and
technology) and growing thicker commercial relations between
do not predominantly point to insider trading but that insiders tend to medium
size block trades in instances of insider trading); United States v. Sarao, No. 15
CR 75, 2016 WL 8792307 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2016) (on the use of orders to
undertake a manipulate strategy on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange).
23 Macey & Kanda, supra note 19, 1020–2l.
24 John McCrank, Luminex ‘Dark Pool’ Enlists 73 Members Ahead of Trading
Launch,
REUTERS
(Oct.
4,
2015,
9:01
PM),
https://www. reuters.com/article/luminex-stocksidUSL1N1240G720151005?virtualBrandChannel=11563
[https://perma.cc/38KZ-E97T] (a new off-exchange venue set up by institutional
investors and asset managers).
25 See infra subpart I.C.
26 See id.
27 See id.
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themselves and their users. For example, exchanges routinely
reward high-volume traders that agree to bring order flow to
the venue.28 These complex business entanglements raise the
cost to an exchange of overseeing and punishing problem
traders. Not only can an exchange lose trading business, but
potentially also interest from their customers in a host of other
revenue-generative services. Furthermore, this loss represents
a competitor’s gain. When a trader wants to avoid a strict
exchange, it can take its business to another platform. The
exercise of oversight represents a particularly poor business
proposition in fragmented markets. In their competing duty to
their shareholders and to the public, exchanges appear
especially conflicted and maybe unable to satisfactorily achieve
either.
Second, this Article shows that trading venues possess few
incentives to cooperate in overcoming the problems of
fragmentation.29 High coordination and information costs
suggest that trading venues should gain by cooperating in
surveillance. By pooling information and sharing monitoring
costs through cooperation, venues can mimic the benefits of
consolidation in oversight, even while competing in other
areas.
But there is little incentive for exchanges and dark pools
to co-operate. Indeed, their incentives may be skewed towards
privately underinvesting precisely because they collectively
share the risks of failure. The design of the national market
encourages venues to compete for private gain but to share the
costs of failing to monitor properly.30
28 Exchanges can offer traders incentives to trade on their venue, for
example, in the form of “maker taker fees.” These fee arrangements are designed
such that traders that provide (“make”) liquidity for others pay a lower fee to trade
on the exchange than those that “take” liquidity. These arrangements seek to
encourage passive market makers to transact on the exchange. For discussion
and critique of these fee arrangements see generally, Stanislav Dolgopolov, The
Maker-Taker Pricing Model and its Impact on the Securities Market Structure, 8 VA.
L. BUS. REV. 231 (2014).
29 See Regulation National Market System Rule 611, Order Protection Rule,
17 CFR 242.611 (2005); Jacob Bunge, NYSE Adjusts Charges in Bid to Draw
Traders,
WALL
S T.
J.
(Feb.
3,
2009),
https://www. wsj.com/articles/SB123362152140241649
[https://perma.cc/X2BA-V2V5] (noting that the NYSE lowered charges and
increased trading speeds in a bid to attract volume away from off-exchange
venues and newer competitors like BATS and Direct Edge exchanges).
30 See David A. Lipton, The SEC or the Exchanges: Who Should Do What and
When? A Proposal to Allocate Regulatory Responsibilities for Securities Markets,
16 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 527, 528–29 (1983) (analyzing early statements by Judge
William O’Douglas suggesting that exchanges held a primary role in market
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Regulation mandates that securities trade where they are
on offer at the best price.31 Once listed on a national exchange,
securities can trade freely across the system of exchanges and
dark pools with the goal of allowing investors to execute their
trades on the platform that offers the best deal or some other
advantage sought by the investor.32 By most accounts, this
strategy has worked to reduce the various fees that investors
pay as a part of trading.33 It has also resulted in an
operationally interconnected market structure, without which
such forum shopping would be impossible.34 Information must
flow freely across the market to advertise the best price for a
security. Traders too must be able to move easily across
venues to transact where it suits them best. As finance
scholars note, this means that markets can be efficient in
transmitting information across venues; they can also be quick
in spreading error, fraud and the ill-effects of risky oversight
from one venue to the next.35
Two implications arise out of this competitive, fragmented
dynamic. One, venues can privately gain by the exercise of lax
oversight. They can attract business to their platform through
the promise of lower fees, light monitoring and weak discipline.
They can also out-compete other venues by generating

supervision).
31 On monopolistic rent seeking, see, for example, the practice of exchanges
fixing set brokerage commissions to trade shares, such that brokers charging
reduced commissions could be expelled from the exchange.
Brokerage
commissions to trade 10 shares were the same as those to trade 1,000 or 100,000
shares, shielding brokerages and exchanges from competition on fees. For
discussion, see, e.g., Jason Zweig, The Day Wall Street Changed, WALL ST. J. (Apr.
30, 2015, 10:35 AM), https://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/04/30/the-daythat-changed-wall-street-forever/
[https://perma.cc/NT5N-W5WM].
On
collusion on the Nasdaq see generally, William G. Christie & Paul H. Schultz,
Why Do NASDAQ Market-makers Avoid Odd-Eighth Quotes, 49 J. FIN. 1813 (1994)
(showing that Nasdaq market-makers padded the spreads that they charged
investors); Prajit Dutta & Ananth Madhavan, Competition and Collusion in Dealer
Markets, 52 J. FIN. 245 (1997) (observing collusive pressures in dealer markets
like the Nasdaq).
32 Regulation National Market System Rule 611, Order Protection Rule, 17
CFR 242.611 (2005).
33 See, e.g., Bunge, supra note 29.
34 Yesha Yadav, The Failure of Liability in Modern Markets, 102 VA. L. REV.
1031, 1090–96 (2016) [hereinafter Yadav, Liability] (analyzing the effectiveness of
the liability framework to protect markets from some of the risks of algorithmic
trading).
35 Austin Gerig, High-Frequency Trading Synchronizes Prices in Financial
Markets
(Jan.
1,
2015)
.
Available
at
SSRN:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2173247[https://perma
.cc/CWB9-8RLA.
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sufficient business to spur network benefits that can further
lower transaction costs for users. And two, competition
between trading venues offers ample motivation to exercise
poor oversight because venues in a fragmented market do not
internalize the full costs of their failure. Rather, with traders
and information moving easily from one venue to the next, lax
venues can partially externalize the costs of their sub-optimal
oversight to others. Exercising robust oversight makes little
sense for individual platforms. Venues within a market where
risks spread easily from one to the next can still lose even if
they take costly precautions. If venues are periodically paying
for someone else’s risk taking, because they are impacted by
the bad behavior of others, it makes sense to also take risks—
and accrue customers—from time to time.
In conclusion, this Article offers a proposal to re-build
exchange oversight in fragmented markets. That exchanges
are now diminished in their ability to fulfill their statutory
mandate is economically of serious concern—even if relying on
private exchanges to police public markets has always been
controversial. Ultimately, a failure by exchanges to properly
exert market discipline raises questions about the viability of
markets to function as a secure and reliable mechanism to
allocate capital. Where policy is focused simply on reducing
front-end investor costs (e.g., lower fees or heightened secrecy)
without also tackling deficits in oversight, investors can end
up paying, albeit in different ways. Ultimately, markets, as a
whole, can suffer where oversight failure causes investors to
discount the value of their capital or otherwise to stop investing
altogether.
This Article suggests removing the qualified immunity
enjoyed by exchanges to make exchanges—and dark pools—
more fully liable for costly disruptions arising on account of
oversight failure. Building on earlier writings, this Article
outlines a design for a new liability regime for exchanges and
dark pools. The rationale underlying greater liability for
trading venues is straightforward. Liability can better ensure
that exchanges and dark pools have a real economic stake in
delivering effective oversight. Importantly, liability levers shift
the cost-benefit trade-offs faced by trading venues when
determining how best to calibrate the intensity of their
supervision. In increasing the costs and consequences of
oversight failure, this Article seeks to better align the private
incentives of trading venues towards the public good.
Recognizing that oversight failure can generate large losses,
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owing to the quick-fire spread of risks through the system, this
Article also outlines a proposal for an industry fund to pay out
to investors in the event of a costly fallout. Such a fund should
further encourage venues to police each other and take
credible steps to share information and coordinate in helping
exchanges oversee securities markets more effectively.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I sets out the
foundational role of exchanges in securities regulation and
enforcement. Part II examines the modern turn towards
market fragmentation, highlighting the tension between
oversight and competition. Part III analyzes the implications
of market fragmentation for the quality of exchange oversight
and capital allocation. Part IV proposes ideas for reform,
outlining a new liability regime for exchanges and dark pools.
I
THE ROLE OF EXCHANGES IN SECURITIES REGULATION
Exchanges constitute the structural backbone of
securities markets. In providing an organized space for
traders, exchanges bring market participants together to
transact, pool information and to monitor one another in
accordance with an agreed-upon set of rules.36 This Part
outlines the role of an exchange in capital allocation and
market oversight. It highlights two dueling policy objectives
guiding regulation.37 On the one hand, regulation relies
heavily on exchanges to police markets, enforce securities laws
and industry norms. On the other, regulatory policy also
favors greater competition in the provision of trading services.
These contrasting priorities have resulted in a heavily
fragmented network of trading venues, that includes
exchanges but also less formal, lightly-regulated ATS,

36 See generally Andreas M. Fleckner & Klaus J. Hopt, Stock Exchange Law:
Concept, History, Challenges, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 513 (2013) (providing a history
of the evolution of the stock exchange and regulation undergirding their
function).
37 MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH B OYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT (2014); S COTT
PATTERSON, DARK POOLS: THE RISE OF THE MACHINE TRADERS AND THE RIGGING OF
THE STOCK MARKET , 322–33 (2013). Regulators have launched widely publicized
actions on issues of microstructure. Keri Geiger & Sam Mamudi, High Speed
Trading Faces New York Probe into Fairness, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 18, 2014),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-03-18/high-speed-tradingsaid-to-face-n-y-probe-into-fairness
[https://perma.cc/5772-ZANR];
Kara
Scannell & Nicole Bullock, SEC Fines NYSE Euronext $4.5m for Breaking Rules,
FIN. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/578b5124-d14b-11e381e0-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/DUV8-FQPZ].
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colloquially termed “dark pools.”38 With fragmentation forcing
exchanges to work harder to compete as well as dividing user
volume between multiple venues, this Part highlights the
challenge facing exchanges in meeting both policy objectives of
oversight and competition.
A. Markets and the Demand for Exchanges
Securities markets transfer capital from investors to
businesses that can use this wealth for growth. A number of
costs make it difficult to realize this goal. First, information is
needed to understand and value the risks of investments; and
secondly, the risks of this capital must be easily transferable
to motivate investors to enter the market in the first place.39
Information: Companies raise money by issuing securities
such as a share or a bond. These securities confer a bundle of
rights on investors, notably an entitlement to claim some share
of a company’s future earnings, through a dividend in the case
of equity, or a fixed portion of its cash flows in the case of a
bond.40 In deciding how much capital they should place at
risk, investors need information to determine the likelihood of
actually receiving the entitlements that they have been
promised. This data helps investors to “price” the claim.41 In
the example of equity, a company with strong credentials—
likely to generate future cash flows for investors—should
command a high price per share. Conversely, a risky profile
will prompt rational investors to reduce what they pay for
claims, such that they will “discount” what they invest to
reflect observable risks.42 Ideally, a promising company wishes
38 See, e.g., Madhavan, supra note 22 (providing a literature survey on some
aspects of market design); O’Hara & Ye, supra note 13. For a discussion of the
literature see generally, Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 4. On the international
regulation of exchanges, see Brummer, supra note 4.
39 See generally Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role
of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711 (2006) (arguing that information
generation constitutes a central imperative of securities regulation and that
encouraging information traders ought to be goal of the regulatory framework);
Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, Markets, and
“Negative” Property Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229 (2001) (examining
insider trading laws and proposing an allocation of informational benefits to
information traders).
40 FRANKLIN A LLEN, RICHARD BREALEY & STEWART MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 45–104 (10th ed. 2011) (describing the salient features of key
security instruments and their valuation).
41 Id. at 74–85.
42 Id. For a summary on valuation and risk discounting, see, for example,
Aswath Damodaran, Equity Risk Premiums: Determinants, Estimation and
Implications, 11–14 (2013). By reduction, investors may decrease what they

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2754786

YADAV FORMATTED

114

11/17/197:23 PM

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol.104:PPP

to minimize discounting, seeking to capture as much capital
from investors as it can get (and deserves). In turn, investors
receive an entitlement to cash flows that reflect their desired
return on capital. Capital is allocated most effectively when
issuers can secure its fullest value, discounted to precisely
reflect its riskiness.43
Trading Costs: But investors can also be put off by the
logistical and economic costs attached to purchasing and
trading a security. Rationally, investors should discount what
they invest in response.
Importantly, those that purchase securities do not always
wish to hold these investments on an open-ended basis. They
would like to be able to exit at a good moment, transferring the
risk to another investor that wishes to assume it and
recovering the capital they have left in the venture. If investors
are unable to trade their risks, or where this transaction
becomes too expensive, investors should discount the capital
they invest in response to the risk of being locked-in to the
consequences of a single decision. Ultimately, the absence of
secondary trading hurts companies seeking capital. When
investors reduce what they are willing to put into the market
because of the high costs of on-selling their risk, businesses
that need capital face a shallower pool of investors to access.44
Investors that wish to buy or sell securities in the
secondary market face a number of expensive logistical
hurdles without an exchange in the picture. For a start, they
must find each other. An investor wishing to sell 100 shares
of Public Company must seek out another investor that is
willing to enter into the other side of the deal. Searches are a
problem where investors are dispersed and whose trading
intentions are not explicit.
In addition to finding a
counterparty, traders must also be prepared to face negotiation
costs in reaching a bargain. Such discussions may be time
consuming, necessitating legal input and subject to complex
bargaining. Pervasive search and negotiation costs will slow
down the pace of secondary trading, increasing further the cost
of capital.45 Finally, counterparties have to be able to rely on

invest or charge a company more for the capital to reflect the perceived riskiness
of their investment.
43 Damodaran, supra note 42.
44 Id.
45 See Craig Pirrong, A Theory of Financial Exchange Organization, 43 J.L. &
ECON. 437, 439–40 (noting the problems of bilateral dealings in the securities
marketplace).
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one another to honor the terms of the negotiated bargain.46
Where a market includes fraudsters, cheats and manipulators,
such trust is likely to be elusive and lacking credibility.
Search costs and concerns about the riskiness of contract
parties point to tensions in a trading system that leaves
economic relationships to be regulated informally between two
players.47 Traders might only reveal information on trades and
prices on an ad hoc basis, leaving swathes of the market
without a reliable reserve of data with which to value securities
and issuer companies.48 This lack of transparency can also
allow room for disruptive traders to flourish. In the absence of
disclosure and oversight, a single trader can create larger risks
than she can manage, forcing the market to bear the
consequences of her failure.49
Bilateral economic relationships, then, can prove
problematic for capital markets. In an environment where
private discipline constitutes the primary means of securing
good conduct, the costs of self-protection can create a barrier
to entry for market participants. In other words, securities

46 On counterparty risk, see Craig Pirrong, the Economics of Central Clearing:
Theory and Practice, ISDA Discussion Paper Number 1, 2–7 (2011).
47 The market for over-the-counter swaps provides an example of a market
where trading has been undertaken bilaterally between sophisticated parties.
From 2001, legislation provided space for traders to transact in swaps essentially
outside of federal oversight and relying on industry conventions to maintain
economic bargains. This market has been widely criticized as generating large
risks for the financial system owing to a lack of transparency, ad hoc risk
management and contributing to the global financial crisis in 2007-8. For
discussion and analysis of this bilateral market, see generally Bushan Jomadar,
The ISDA Master Agreement - The Rise and Fall of a Major Financial Instrument
(Westminster Business School, Working Paper, 2007); Atlantic Council
Divergence
Report
1,
29–31
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Danger_of_Divergence_Tr
ansatlantic_Financial_Reform_1-22.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7WY-2AHW]. For a
discussion on the private regulation of risk, see Randall S. Kroszner, Can the
Financial Markets Privately Regulate Risk? The Development of Derivatives
Clearinghouses and Recent Over-the-Counter Innovations, 31 J. MONEY, CREDIT &
BANKING 596, 598–606 (1999).
48 The literature on private ordering is extensive. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein,
Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent
Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996) (examining the effectiveness of
private monitoring and adjudication mechanisms in the grain industry); Barak
D. Richman, Firms, Courts and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive
Theory of Private Ordering, 104 C OLUM. L. REV. 2328 (2004) (offering a taxonomy
of private ordering models); Oliver E. Williamson, Economic Institutions:
Spontaneous and Intentional Governance, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 159, 167–71
(1991) (examining reputational sanction as a source of private discipline).
49 LAWRENCE HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES : MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE FOR
PRACTITIONERS, 3–8 (2003).
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trading can become the preserve of deep-pocketed, powerful
traders who either have the means to enforce discipline from
others, or who can stand to absorb the risks of externalities
created by badly behaved peers. Capital markets and their
ability to allocate capital can suffer deeply as a result. As
Professors Ronald J. Gilson and Reiner R. Kraakman famously
observe, markets work best where they play host to a
heterogeneous mix of traders, large and small, informed and
uninformed, whose interactions generate the information
needed to convey a fuller understanding of what public
companies are worth.50 If markets are too hostile for all but a
handful of the most hardy of traders, their ability to foster a
rich interplay between market participants deteriorates
markedly.51 Capital allocation suffers in two important ways:
(i) companies seeking capital have access to a smaller pool of
investors; and (ii) information on these companies becomes
shallower as well as distorted where prices reflect a slew of
complex transaction costs.
B. Exchanges and Capital Allocation
Exchanges institutionalize efforts by securities traders to
collectively reduce the information, disciplinary and
transaction costs inherent to trading.52 First, exchanges set
ground rules for the companies that wish to list their securities
on the venue, ensuring that they conform to standards of
financial robustness, governance and organizational viability.53
This helps to reassure investors that companies issuing claims
to the public possess the reserves to make good on their
promises. Secondly, an exchange brings investors together to
50 See generally Ronald Gilson & Reinier R. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of
Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984) [hereinafter Gilson & Kraakman,
Mechanisms] (analyzing information efficiency and the process of generating
efficient prices); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier R. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of
Market Efficiency: Twenty Years On, Discussion Paper (2003); Ronald J. Gilson
& Reinier R. Kraakman, Market Efficiency after the Financial Crisis: It’s Still a
Matter of Information Costs (Columbia Law and Economics, Working Paper No.
470, 2014) [hereinafter Gilson & Kraakman, Information Costs] (arguing that
market efficiency constitutes the best, albeit imperfect, proxy for understanding
the real value of companies); see also James Dow, Itay Goldstein & Alexander
Guembel, Incentives for Information Production in Markets where Prices Affect Real
Investment, 15 J. EUR. ECON. A SS’N 877 (2017).
51 On information efficiency, see discussion infra subsections I.A–B.
52 Pirrong, supra note 45, at 437–42.
53 Onnig Dombalagian, Demythologizing the Stock Exchange; Reconciling SelfRegulation and the National Market System, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1069, 1072–79
(2005); Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of Corporate Governance Listing
Requirements, 54 S.M.U. L. REV. 325 (2001).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2754786

YADAV FORMATTED

11/17/19 7:23 PM

2019] OVERSIGHT FAILURE IN SECURITIES MARKETS

117

trade these listed securities with one another in accordance
with set rules.54
Traditionally, exchanges have limited
membership to firms with demonstrated expertise in matching
investors with one another (“brokers”) as well as in purchasing
securities for their own books (“dealers”).55 Firms that can
match buyers and sellers of securities, as well as those ready
to put their own money on the line to facilitate trade, help
generate volume for the exchange.56
Network Externalities: Exchanges thus seek to capture and
build networks of traders and information to allocate capital
more efficiently. Exchanges function best by bringing a large
number of qualified traders to their floor. The more traders an
exchange can attract, the more easily these actors can
conclude bargains and transact in information. For an
exchange, more business should also mean more profit. A
solid profit margin should enable exchanges to reduce fees and
to use these lower charges to attract even more traders to the
floor, fueling this growth cycle further.57
Finance scholars have long recognized the significance of
these network effects for anchoring the economic functions of
the exchange.58
First, as Professor Ananth Madhavan
observes, network effects help exchanges become better at
what they are supposed to do: to match buyers and sellers of
securities quickly and cheaply. An exchange that is home to
54 See, e.g., Karmel, supra note 4, at 159–60 (noting the origins of the New
York Stock Exchange from 1792 when it was established following high volatility
in the nascent U.S. government securities market). The NYSE was initially
formed by 24 brokers pursuant to the Buttonwood Tree Agreement. For a
collection of key sources describing the history of the NYSE, see Ellen Terrell
(ed.),
History
of
the
New York
Stock
Exchange,
(Oct.
2012),
https://www.loc.gov/rr/business/hottopic/stock_market.html
[https://perma.cc/G8YL-8J9N].
55 Exchange Act § 6(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a)(3) (2000); Exchange Act §
15A(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(4) (2000).
For discussion, see Onnig
Dombalagian, supra note 53, at 1072–79; Karmel, supra note 4, at 160–63. On
the role of dealers in maintaining market liquidity and pricing, see generally
Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Market Making and Inventory, 8 J. FIN. ECON.
31 (1980) (detailing the function of dealers on the market, who buy and sell on
their own account to maintain market liquidity); Katrina Ellis, Roni Michaely &
Maureen O’Hara, The Making of a Dealer Market: From Entry to Equilibrium in the
Trading of Nasdaq Stocks, 57 J. FIN. 2289 (2002).
56 See Macey & Kanda, supra note 19, at 1012–13 (noting that liquidity refers
to the ability of traders to buy or sell quickly at a price connected to available
information in the market).
57 See Mark Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network
Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 479 (1998) (describing network effects and
their increasing analytical significance in judicial decision-making).
58 For a summary, see Madhavan, supra note 22, at 23–24.
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more traders will likely find it easier to fulfill this core purpose.
Exchanges with a larger volume of users are likely to showcase
richer liquidity—the ability of traders to enter and exit an
investment rapidly and cost-effectively.59
The promise of liquidity should attract expert traders who
can help markets become even more effective at their job.
Exchanges promising a steady volume of investors should
appeal to expert dealers—firms that use their own money to
buy and sell security rather than just brokering deals for
others.60 Dealers make markets more liquid by offering a
ready, reliable counterparty for investors and for smoothing
out the vagaries of demand and supply.61 For these dealers,
liquid markets represent a lucrative source of profit. By taking
a slice of gain from the difference between the prices to buy
and sell Public Company’s securities (the “spread”), dealers
make reliable gains by intermediating trades during the day.
Dealers and exchanges can, in fact, mutually benefit from each
other. Exchanges win if they can host dealers willing to
maintain the smooth flow of trades and to prevent spikes and
crashes in demand and supply. In turn, dealers gain if they
can transact on busy venues, capturing steady profits from the
liquidity available on major venues.62
Secondly, deep liquidity can enhance the appeal of
markets to a broad and diverse mix of the investor community.
Rather than just bringing the toughest, most resourced
investors onto the floor, liquid, reasonably-priced markets
should encourage a wider cross-section of investors to enter
the arena. As Professors Gilson and Kraakman observe,
59 The definition of liquidity in finance is notoriously problematic and
complex. See Macey & Kanda, supra note 19, at 1012–14; Bengt Holmström and
Jean Tirole, Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring, 101 J. POL. ECON. 678
(1993) (noting the significance of higher liquidity in securities markets for
scrutinizing public companies).
60 Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 55; Harold Demsetz, The Cost of
Transacting, 82 Q.J. ECON. 33 (1968) (on the significance of intermediation).
61 See, e.g., Ananth Madhavan, supra note 22, at 212–13; Douglas J. Elliott,
Market Liquidity: A Primer, ECON. STUD. BROOKINGS, 1, 3–4 (2015).
62 Hendrik Bessembinder, Jia Hao & Michael Lemmon, Why Designate
Market Makers? Affirmative Obligations and Market Quality (Working Paper,
2011); Stanislav Dolgopolov, Regulating Merchants of Liquidity: Market Making
from Crowded Floors to High-Frequency Trading, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 651 (2016);
New
York
Stock
Exchange,
Designated
Market
Makers,
https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/listing/fact_sheet_dmm.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FZN8-JHKJ].
The Nasdaq operates as an exchange
comprising dealers that are each responsible for maintaining a market in specific
securities that are listed on the Nasdaq. On the Nasdaq dealer system, see
Katrina Ellis, Roni Michaely & Maureen O’Hara, supra note 55.
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markets work most efficiently when they attract a variety of
viewpoints and levels of information from expert, informed
investors as well as those that may be less uninformed.63
Network effects can be beneficial for market quality and
exchange performance. As Professor Madhavan notes, if a
market includes more traders, then its fraction of informed
traders as a proportion of the overall number of traders should
fall.64 This is because, proportionately, a small set of informed
traders will operate in a market comprised largely of
uninformed actors. As Madhavan posits, this dynamic is a
positive for the market. It provides an incentive to informed
traders to enter, knowing they will win against lesser-informed
actors.65 Dealers too should be more active. They can profit
from uninformed traders and will have an incentive to provide
liquidity more willingly.66
Information Gains: Network effects also help make markets
better at lowering the costs of acquiring and disseminating
information.
Fewer information costs should encourage
investment and reduce discounting.
First, a large cohort of economically diverse,
heterogeneous traders—led by informed investors—should
help make markets more efficient at reflecting a swathe of
information. In the now classic account, theory holds that
markets are efficient when they reflect publicly-available
information in the prices at which securities trade.67 By this
account, new information on a security changes its price. The
faster prices adapt to reflect emerging information on a

63 Gilson & Kraakman, Mechanisms, supra note 50. For further discussion,
see generally Yadav, Liability, supra note 34.
64 Madhavan, supra note 22, at 23–24.
65 Id.
66 Lawrence R. Glosten, Insider Trading, Liquidity and the Role of the
Monopolist Specialist, 62 J. BUS. 211 (1989) (a seminal article articulating that
market makers transact as uninformed traders and lose money to informed
actors).
67 Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and
Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970) (“A market in which prices always
‘fully reflect’ available information is called ‘efficient.’”). The literature in this
area is vast. The efficient capital markets hypothesis has proven controversial,
for example, by those that lament its lack of explanation of irrational human
behavior as an aspect of the price formation process. See, e.g., ANDREI
SCHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: A N I NTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000);
Lawrence H. Summers, Does the Stock Market Rationally Reflect Fundamental
Values?, 41 J. FIN. 591 (1986). In the legal literature see, for example, Lynn A.
Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: Introduction to the New Finance, 28
J. CORP. L. 635 (2002).
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company’s securities, the better a market’s overall efficiency.68
Prices can offer investors easily understood, low-cost insights
into what the market believes a security is worth—its
fundamental value.
By aggregating the store of public
information into an indicator of present worth, the price should
include insights about a company’s true value.69 While
inexact—as prices only reflect current information—they can
still offer an approximate measure of a company’s real worth.70
Exchanges that introduce a swath of actors into the price
formation process can help enhance informational efficiency—
and capital allocation. Deep liquidity, an active cohort of
market makers, as well as a familiar trading environment, can
incentivize the interaction of informed and other traders.71
This interplay should generate a more exact price, reflecting
the information that these diverse traders bring to the floor. In
turn, a richly-informed market can facilitate capital
allocation.72
Indeed, the ability of exchanges to generate prices
efficiently has become a hallmark of their function. Exchanges
have long invested in building systems needed to disseminate
prices widely and promptly across their venue, through such
innovations as the telegraph and the “ticker.”73 By circulating
68 Recent literature has focused on the use of high-speed algorithms as
drivers of increasing efficiency, showing that these can help bring information to
the markets more quickly. See, for example, Jonathan Brogaard, Terence
Hendershott & Ryan Riordan, High Frequency Trading and Price Discovery
(European Central Bank, Working Paper No. 1602, 2013) . For discussion, see
generally Yesha Yadav, How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in Capital
Markets, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1607 (2015) [hereinafter Yadav, Algorithmic Trading]
(suggesting that algorithmic trading increases information efficiency in the short
term but may undermine long-term capital allocative efficiency).
69 Goshen & Parchmovksy, supra note 39 (describing the essential role of
information professionals in price formation and securities regulation).
70 Gilson & Kraakman, Information Costs, supra note 50.
71 Gilson & Kraakman, Mechanisms, supra note 50, at 554, 565–80.
72 Legal scholarship has developed an extensive literature on the role of
mandatory disclosure for price formation, better share prices and capital
allocation. A review of this literature is largely outside of the scope of this Article.
See, notably, John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a
Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 720–30 (1984); Merritt B. Fox
et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy and Economic Performance: The New Evidence,
102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 339–41 (2003). For a critical perspective on the need for
a mandatory disclosure regime, see generally HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE (1979).
73 The Ticker displays prevailing buy and sell quotes in a particular security.
The Ticker relied on the development of wire and telegraph technology to
disseminate quotes widely geographically in the marketplace. More recently,
exchanges have been investing heavily in developing technologies to disseminate
quotes and prices as quickly as possible using such innovations as microwave
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prices to all traders within their venues, exchanges are able to
“produce” a viable market for financial products,74 connecting
price formation to capital allocation in the marketplace.75
C. The Significance of Exchange Oversight
Given their role in bringing traders together and with
proximity to the information they generate, exchanges are
ideally placed to regulate, monitor and discipline markets.
Public regulators have long recognized the powerful potential
of exchanges to exercise oversight.76 Exchanges directly
intermediate securities trades, giving them first sight of market
activity.77 Importantly, their network effects mean that traders
prize access to the exchange floor.78 The threat of exclusion,
sanction or rebuke from an exchange should represent a
strong source of discipline for traders and issuers seeking
entry into the market.
Regulators rely on exchanges to set standards for behavior
on their own trading venues as well as to assist in the
enforcement of securities laws on the books.79 Section 6 of the
Securities and Exchange Act requires an exchange to ensure
that its users comply with the exchange’s own rules as well as
with applicable laws and standards, including those governing
fraud and manipulation.80 Exchanges play an essential role in
the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)—the
statute enacted in the wake of high-profile corporate
governance scandals in the 2000s, that mandates
thoroughgoing checks of a public company’s internal corporate

technology to communicate with traders in increments measured in milliseconds.
For discussion, see Yadav, Insider Trading, supra note 3, at 992–98. On the
Ticker, see sources cited infra note 162.
74 J. Harold Mulherin, Jeffrey M. Netter & James A. Overdahl, Prices as
Property: The Organization of Exchanges from a Transaction Costs Perspective, 34
J.L. ECON. 591 (1991) (noting that exchanges use prices as a mechanism to
produce markets); see also Kenneth D. Garbade & William L. Silber, Technology,
Communication and the Performance of Financial Markets: 1840-1975, 33 J. FIN.
819 (1978); Macey & Kanda, supra note 19.
75 In the early days of the NYSE, the NYSE attempted to contractually restrict
the ability of quotes and prices generated on the NYSE to be utilized by outside
trading venues. Mulherin, Netter & Overdahl, supra note 74, at 605–11
(discussing extensive litigation in the early history of the NYSE and the definition
of NYSE’s property rights in the information that it generates).
76 Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 4; Macey & Kanda, supra note 19.
77 Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 4, at 1246–52.
78 Id.
79 See sources cited supra note 3.
80 See sources cited supra note 3.
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controls.81 Exchanges verify that companies seeking to go
public can demonstrate compliance with core SOX provisions
in relation to board composition, director independence and
oversight committees, before they can list.82 In this way,
regulators harness the importance of exchange services for
issuer companies as well as traders—and the high costs of
being excluded from them—as a way to produce good behavior.
On paper, exchanges possess strong incentives to exercise
high quality oversight. As Professors Paul G. Mahoney and
Adam C. Pritchard write, exchanges should be motivated to
craft rules that are tough enough to attract top-listed
companies, trading firms and market participants.83
Otherwise, an exchange will fail on account of hosting poorquality market participants. Scholars have diverged on exactly
how much authority exchanges ought to be accorded, as
between public and private regulators.84 While Professors
Mahoney and Pritchard have advocated for greater delegation
of authority to exchanges, others like Professor Marcel Kahan
have urged caution in view of the conflicts of interests
discussed below.85 Scholarly disagreement on how much
power exchanges should have is unavoidable. However, the
idea that exchanges ought to develop rules for monitoring and
81 Pub. L. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)
has been the source of considerable academic debate as to its real benefits for
public companies, the usefulness of SOX’s disclosure and reporting standards
and key provisions like SOX, section 404. This Article does not seek to enter
these debates. The literature on these questions is rich and expansive. For an
excellent review and discussion, see generally John C. Coates & Suraj Srinivasan,
SOX after Ten Years: A Multidisciplinary Review, Harvard Law and Economics
Discussion Paper No. 758 (2014) (noting inconclusive welfare effects). For a more
general survey on corporate governance and reporting rule-making, see generally
Christian Leuz & Peter Wysocki, Economic Consequences of Financial Reporting
and Disclosure Regulation: A Review and Suggestions for Future Research,
Working Paper (2008) (noting convergence in corporate governance standards,
notably in relation to financial reporting).
82 See, e.g., Section 303A.00, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS :
CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY,
NYSE
LISTING
HANDBOOK ,
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer. asp?selectednode=ch
p_1_2&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm-sections%2F
[https://perma.cc/2BRS-TAAN.].
83 Mahoney, supra note 19, at 1457–59; Adam C. Pritchard, Markets as
Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud
Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925 (1999) (observing the benefits of exchange
regulation for securities fraud enforcement); see also Brummer, supra note 4
(analyzing exchanges as “sellers” of law).
84 Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 4 (for a survey of approaches in different
jurisdictions including the U.S.).
85 Marcel Kahan, Some Problems with Stock Exchange Based Securities
Regulation, 83 VA. L. REV. 1509 (1997).
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discipline has gone largely uncontested. As scholars tracing
their history have remarked, exchange rules have been
regulating markets long before public regulators formally took
up the task.86 In return, exchanges have come to enjoy an
expansive legal immunity from investor lawsuits in the
performance of their oversight functions.87
This section highlights key areas of regulatory power held
by exchanges over traders and issuers: (i) listing rules for
public companies; and (ii) rules governing the conduct of
traders on the exchange.88
Listing Rules: exchanges stipulate an extensive set of rules
and conditions for companies that wish to publicly list their
securities on their venue. This gatekeeping function assures
investors that companies coming to the marketplace for capital
can fulfill a base standard of organizational viability and
competence.89 Listing standards span the full panoply of a
company’s organization, its business, financial health and its
on-going activities and events. The NYSE Listings Handbook,
setting out the NYSE’s eligibility conditions for listing, requires
any public company to satisfy specific corporate governance
and financial conditions and to offer extensive disclosure with
respect to earnings, market capitalization, board composition
and key personnel.90 The NYSE wants its public companies to
detail how their organization internally handles confidential
information, for instance. Such information is useful to the
exchange to decide whether corporate personnel might have
engaged in insider trading in relation to key announcements.91
Public companies must keep the exchange informed of major
events and to correct misinformation in the market.92
Updating assists the exchange to fulfill market surveillance.
86 See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 19, at 1459–62; Mulherin, Netter &
Overdahl, supra note 74, at 605–20.
87 See supra notes 1, 4, 5.
88 For example, exchanges are also regulated by the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority or FINRA, a self-regulatory organization formed by broker
dealers to regulate and supervise the industry.
FINRA, A BOUT FINRA ,
http://www.finra.org/about [https://perma.cc/HBP8-3EX9].
89 See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 19, at 1461–62.
90 NYSE,
NYSE
LISTING
HANDBOOK,
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer. asp?selectednode=ch
p_1_2&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm-sections%2F
[https://perma.cc/MW8H-SFXX].
91 Exchanges are required by statute to facilitate detection and enforcement
of the prohibition against insider trading. See sources cited supra note 4.
92 Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 4, at 1247; Pritchard, supra note 83, at
1008–11.
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For example, if a company faces a rumor such as possible
bankruptcy, its stock might crash in price and cause a larger
shock across the market. In such scenarios, an exchange
might be expected to take steps to prevent a spiraling crisis
from causing disruption to other issuers and traders.93
For investors giving money to a public company in the
expectation of future returns, such vetting represents an
enormous benefit.
Rather than make investors review
corporate and financial disclosures for conformity with
accepted standards, exchanges can do so instead. Moreover,
the oversight exercised by the exchange to enforce securities
and corporate governance standards can help standardize the
internal composition and conduct of public companies. This
can make it easier to understand the information that
companies produce.94
The significance of this scrutiny becomes readily apparent
in cases when the exchange enforces its rules. Exchanges can
“de-list” the securities of a public company such that these can
no longer be traded on the venue.95 Sometimes, a delisting can
happen by choice and prior agreement between the company
and exchange (for example because of a merger).96 But it can
also occur involuntarily, such as when a company falls foul of
the threshold conditions the exchange sets for listing.97
Analyzing the approximately 9000 companies de-listed by the
NYSE, Nasdaq and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) between

93 NYSE,
NYSE
LISTING
HANDBOOK,
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer. asp?selectednode=ch
p_1_2&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm-sections%2F
[https://perma.cc/33H2-5577]; see also the NASDAQ, I NITIAL LISTING GUIDE
https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/assets/initialguide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UD2L-529N].
94 Jonathan R. Macey, Maureen O’Hara & David Pompilio, Down and Out in
the Stock Market: The Law and Economics of the Delisting Process, 51 J.L. & ECON
683, 686–87 (2008) (analyzing the workings of the delisting process).
95 See,
e. g . ,
NYSE
Mkt
Continued
Listing
Standards,
https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/markets/nyseamerican/MKT_Continued_Listing_Standards.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M4B2KH9N].
96 The steps for a merger-related delisting may be initiated by the exchange
or by the company undergoing a merger, to start with using Form 25. See, e.g.,
SECTION 804.00, PROCEDURE FOR DELISTING, NYSE LISTING HANDBOOK ,
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer. asp?selectednode=ch
p_1_2&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm-sections%2F
[https://perma.cc/FU3U-PYC6]. For discussion, see generally W. Andrew Jack
and Keir D. Gumbs, Going Dark from a Deal, C ORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW
ADVISOR INSIGHTS (Feb. 2007).
97 Macey, O’Hara & Pompilio, supra note 94, at 689–90.
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1995 and 2005, Professors Macey, O’Hara and Pompilio
concluded that almost half of all de-listings were involuntary.
These occurred for a number of reasons, for example, if the
company entered bankruptcy, or if it failed to maintain a
minimum asset-value or market capitalization.98 Exchanges
can also discipline or delist a firm if it cannot meet corporate
governance standards, if trading certain securities is not in the
public interest or when the exchange deems a company to be
unsuitable for listing.99
Empirical studies examining the delisting and exchange
disciplinary process for listed companies consistently affirm its
financial and expressive importance.100 In their study on NYSE
de-listings, Macey, O’Hara and Pompilio noted that firms that
underwent the procedure suffered dramatic, significant
costs.101 Share prices fell by 50% and volatility doubled.
Similarly, an examination of Nasdaq listings showed that
delisted companies saw a 50% fall in share price, a tripling of
the spread and a sharp decrease in trading volume.102 These
costs might partially reflect the impact of reduced liquidity offexchange and the higher risks associated with a newly delisted company. However, exchange oversight clearly matters.
In a study on the impact of corporate governance deficiency
notices issued by the Nasdaq to delinquent companies,

98 See, e.g., Alex Longley, NYSE Is Delisting National Bank of Greece After 91%
Plunge,
BLOOMBERG,
Nov.
27,
2015
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-27/nyse-is-delistingnational-bank-of-greece-after-91-plunge [https://perma.cc/QG87-TZJL]; Nina
Mehta, AMR Delisted from NYSE a Month After Bankruptcy Filing, BLOOMBERG,
Dec. 29, 2011 (noting the delisting of American Airlines following the filing of its
Chapter
11
bankruptcy
petition)
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-12-29/amr-delisted-fromnyse-a-month-after-bankruptcy-filing-1- [https://perma.cc/DUM7-D3BY].
99 Section 802-01(D), C ONTINUED LISTING: OTHER CRITERIA, NYSE LISTING
HANDBOOK ,
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer. asp?selectednode=ch
p_1_2&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm-sections%2F
[https://perma.cc/TAX4-3ELB].
100 For example, following allegations of insider trading and the resignation of
its auditor KPMG, Herbalife—the nutrition supplement company—was forced to
deny suggestions that it could lose its listing on the NYSE. Steven Russolillo,
Herbalife Doesn’t Expect NYSE Delisting After KPMG Resignation, WALL ST. J.
MARKETBEAT,
April.
9,
2013;
NYSE,
NON-COMPLIANT
ISSUERS,
https://www.nyse.com/regulation/noncompliant-issuers
[https://perma.cc/3EEX-ZRC4].
101 Macey, O’Hara & Pompilio, supra note 94, at 686–87.
102 Venkatesh Panchapagesan & Ingrid Werner, From Pink Slips to Pink
Sheets: Market Quality Around Delisting from Nasdaq (EFA 2004 Maastricht
Meetings, Working Paper No. 4572, 2004).
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Professors Carol A. Frost, Joshua Racca and Mary Stanford
noted a “significantly negative” market response to the news
that a company had received a notice.103 The authors found
that most companies receiving a notice eventually remedied
their behavior and returned to compliance. The negative
market response, however, suggested that investors were
paying attention to the signaling value of the exchange’s
enforcement efforts.104
Policing Traders: In addition to scrutinizing the behavior of
listed companies, exchanges also stipulate rules-of-the-road
for traders wishing to transact on the venue. Rather than allow
any interested investor to enter the marketplace, exchanges
restrict entry to qualified persons able to satisfy set specific
eligibility criteria pertaining to such factors as financials,
employee qualifications, books and records and firm capital.105
In addition, traders must subscribe to rules of good behavior
once on the trading floor. Conduct rules are designed to
safeguard the market against the risks of traders committing
abuses like fraud, manipulation or misusing confidential
information garnered on account of access to the exchange.106
Under the Securities and Exchange Act, national exchanges
have considerable power to discipline members that fail to
103 Carol A. Frost, Joshua Racca & Mary Stanford, Shareholder Wealth Effects
of Corporate Governance Deficiencies on Nasdaq 3 (Working Paper, 2017). See
also Gary Sanger & James D. Peterson, An Empirical Analysis of Common Stock
Delistings, 25 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE A NALYSIS 261 (1990) (noting price declines
after delisting announcements).
104 In one international study examining the impact of exchange regulation
on firm performance, scholars studied listings on the London Stock Exchange
(LSE), which imposes strict governance conditions, and what happens when
these listings move to the expressly more lightly regulated Alternative Investment
Market (AIM). See generally Tim Jenkinson & Tarun Ramadorai, Does One Size
Fit All? The Consequences of Switching Markets with Different Regulatory
Standards (ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 212, 2008). Scholars noted that
companies that moved from the LSE to the AIM see a 5% fall in share price on
the announcement. Id. at 19. Smaller companies, however, reverse these losses,
suggesting that the lighter regulation may be beneficial for some companies. Id.
at 26–27. For more discussion, see generally id.
105 See,
e. g . ,
NYSE,
EQUITIES
RULES,
http://wallstreet.cch.com/MKTtools/PlatformViewer.asp?SelectedNode=chp_1_
5&manual=/MKT/rules/mkt-rules/. It is worth noting that exchanges can
sometimes offer “direct market access” to some investors. Rather than become
members of an exchange, investors can use a member’s ID to access an exchange
floor, subject to supervision by an exchange member. NYSE, EQUITIES, SPECS AND
CONNECTIVITY
OPTIONS,
https://www.nyse.com/connectivity/specs
[https://perma.cc/92HF-RKQD].
106 See,
e. g . ,
NYSE
ARCA,
EQUITIES
RULES:
CONDUCT
RULES,
http://nysearcarules.nyse.com/PCXtools/PlatformViewer. asp?SelectedNode=c
hp_1_1&manual=/PCX/pcxe/pcxe-rules/ [https://perma. cc/LN8B-DB85].
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follow applicable laws and exchange rules, ranging from simple
rebukes to outright exclusion from the venue.107
This reliance on exchange oversight makes a great deal of
sense.
Exchanges harbor close informational and
transactional ties to their traders, with experience and
expertise in understanding how traders behave.108 Moreover,
exchanges occupy a front-row seat on the latest action
happening on the trading floor.109
Critically, exchange
discipline should have real bite. Punishment by an exchange,
encompassing fines, public rebukes, formal warnings and
ultimately exclusion carries stigma as well as the real economic
cost of traders losing the ability to easily buy and sell
securities.110
Importantly, exchange oversight saves
investors—as well as taxpayers—the time, money and effort of
performing this task by themselves. Rather than spending a
portion of their capital in investigating and disciplining traders
or listed companies, investors can rely on exchanges to do this
work instead. With expertise, information and disciplinary
power, exchanges should be able to do a more efficient job of
this task than individual investors.
And by relying on
exchanges for oversight, investors do not have to discount the
capital they put into the market. Public regulators benefit too.
By monitoring and enforcing securities rules, exchanges can
reduce the resource burden on the public purse and increase
the intensity of discipline directed at the market. With
exchanges made part of the regulatory apparatus, public
authorities can co-opt for-profit private venues into
safeguarding trading, rather than leaving them to engage in
risky behavior along with the rest of the market.
Indeed, the power of exchange oversight is also revealed by
the cases where exchanges appear to have fallen short in
§6(b)(7), Securities Exchange Act 1934.
For discussion, see Yadav, Liability, supra note 34. On rapid price
synchronicity in automated markets, see generally Gerig, supra note 35. On
market automation more broadly and the role of high-speed algorithms in
everyday trading, see generally Jonathan Brogaard, Terence Hendershott & Ryan
Riordan, High Frequency Trading and Price Discovery (European Central Bank,
Working Paper No. 1602, 2013); Alain Chaboud, Benjamin Chiquoine, Erik
Hjalmarsson & Clara Vega, Rise of the Machines: Algorithmic Trading in the
Foreign Exchange Market (July 5, 2013). On the volatility and riskiness of highspeed, automated markets, see Robert Jarrow & Phillip Protter, A Dysfunctional
Role of High Frequency Trading in Electronic Markets 3–6 (Johnson Sch. Research
Paper Series, No. 08-2011, 2011).
109 SEC Regulation Systems, Compliance and Integrity (Reg. SCI), Release No.
34 7363917 CFR Parts 240 (Feb. 2015).
110 See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 19.
107
108
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discharging their responsibilities. For instance, the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange (CME)—a leading marketplace for trading
derivatives—was widely criticized for its failure to supervise the
infamous brokerage firm, MF Global.
In that case, an
apparently insufficient examination by the CME of MF Global’s
systems for managing client money failed to catch
intermingling between MF Global’s own funds and those of its
clients. After losing a $6.3 billion on a bet in the market, MF
Global declared bankruptcy, jeopardizing around $1.6 billion
of co-mingled client money.111
In May 2010, the CME was again under scrutiny for
seeming laxness in disciplining a trader that appeared to have
been engaged in deliberately deceiving markets—entering a
series of fake orders with the intent of altering securities prices.
According to a complaint by the CFTC and the Justice
Department, this single trader impacted the market powerfully
enough to precipitate an almost 1000-point drop in the Dow
Jones Index. The trader was known to the CME because of
prior bad dealings. Although the exchange had warned him
repeatedly for his conduct, it had failed to take further action
to exclude him from the venue. In that case, trouble on the
CME rapidly cascaded across various other exchanges and
venues resulting in a system-wide crisis, now known as the
Flash Crash.112

111 Gregory Meyer & Hal Weitzman, MF Global’s Fall Puts Spotlight on CME
Group, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2011. Matthew Leising & Donal Griffin, Corzine’s Lack
of MF Global Controls Exposed With Missing Cash, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 2, 2011),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-11-02/corzine-s-lack-of-mfglobal-controls-exposed-with-missing-customer-money. . .
[https://perma.cc/M49X-S239]. For analysis, see Rena S. Miller, The MF Global
Bankruptcy, Missing Customer Funds, and Proposals for Reform, Congressional
Research Service Report 7-5700 (Aug. 1, 2013).
112 For detail, see United States v. Sarao, Criminal Complaint N.D.Ill. . .,
Case Number 15 CR 75., Feb. 11, 2015. For comment, see John Cassidy, The
Day Trader and the Flash Crash: Unanswered Questions, THE NEW YORKER, Apr.
23, 2015. For a report disputing this account by the Justice Department and
the CFTC, see Eric M. Aldrich, Joseph Grundfest & Gregory Laughlin, The Flash
Crash:
A
New
Deconstruction
4–7
(Working
Paper,
2016),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2721922
[https://perma.cc/6HWC-MLXE]. For another explanation, see Andrei Kirilenko
et al., The Flash Crash: High Frequency Trading in an Electronic Market, 72 J. FIN.
967 (2017) (detailing an alternative story for the Flash Crash, focusing on a large
sell order from a Kansas mutual fund and a subsequent disappearance of
liquidity
provided
by
high
frequency
traders.
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@economicanalysis/documents/file/
oce_flashcrash0314.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VDZ-EQHF]; Craig Pirrong, Did
Spoofing Cause the Flash Crash? Not So Fast!, STREETWISE PROFESSOR (Apr. 22,
2013),
http://streetwiseprofessor.com/?p=9331
[https://perma.cc/2CF3-
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Cases like the collapse of MF Global and the near miss
during the Flash Crash illustrate the significance as well as the
costs of poor exchange oversight. Clearly, exchanges face
financial and reputational pressures to provide good policing,
a fact that has not gone unremarked by the exchanges
themselves. In its annual disclosure the operators of the NYSE
note, for instance, the need for its organization to devote
“significant resources” to maintain the apparatus of
surveillance, investigation and discipline.113
To be sure, oversight by exchanges is far from
uncontroversial. Exchanges like the NYSE and Nasdaq are
themselves part of for-profit corporate groups, whose own
shares are listed and traded.114 Numerous scholars have
remarked on the deeply distorted incentives that for-profit
exchanges harbor to be good monitors and disciplinarians.115
Traders and listed companies—even if badly behaved—provide
the profits that deliver dividends to an exchange’s own
shareholders. Limiting the business or imposing high costs
that drive traders off-exchange can represent a bad outcome
for an exchange’s bottom line. As Professor Kahan observes,
exchanges may also be reluctant to acknowledge that their
venues can be a home to misbehaving traders and thus may
think twice before taking action.116 These concerns are not
merely theoretical. In a prominent rebuke to the Chicago
Board of Options Exchange (CBOE)—a derivatives exchange—
the SEC chastised and fined the CBOE $6 million for failing to
discipline a problem trader and for privileging its own business
interests over and above the public good. In this case, when
the problem trader came under SEC investigation, the CBOE
went as far as to help the trader with drafting its submission
to the SEC and additionally failed to give information on the
trader to the regulator.117 Indeed, the NYSE’s own corporate
disclosures openly acknowledge the contradiction at the heart

BRUJ].
113 INTERCONTINENTAL
EXCHANGE,
A NNUAL
REPORT,
25
(2017),
https://ir.theice.com/~/media/Files/I/Ice-IR/annual-reports/2017/2017annual-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SPW-A4ZT].
114 See, e.g., INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE , A NNUAL REPORT, id. at 4–9 (2014).
115 Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 4; Karmel, supra note 4; Pirrong, supra
note 45.
116 Kahan, supra note 85, at 1517–59.
117 Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Charges CBOE
for
Regulatory
Failures
(June
11,
2013),
https://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/136517157534
8 [https://perma.cc/XZ54-KE4W].
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of exchange policing between the exchange’s costly role as
regulator—and its private need to make a profit for its own
shareholders.118
Still, the rationale underpinning this expenditure
ultimately rests on ensuring a more efficient environment for
capital allocation. In the absence of exchanges exercising
oversight, investors must bear the burden of protecting
themselves or require public regulators to absorb higher
enforcement costs.
Facing systematic, duplicative costs,
investors will be reluctant to place the full value of their capital
at risk. Instead, they will rationally discount what they invest
to reflect the expenditure they assume in policing companies
and traders.119 Where such discounts are significant and
systematically applied, public companies and capital markets
will be much the poorer for it. Where public regulators pick
up the slack, taxpayer resources must be deployed. If an
exchange represents a more experienced, efficient overseer,
taxpayer funds will be unnecessarily depleted.
II
COMPETITION AND FRAGMENTATION IN MARKET STRUCTURE
Exchanges rely on network benefits to attract trading
volume.120 Logic would suggest that markets are best served
when they consolidate all their trading into one or perhaps a
small number of venues. Consolidation can heighten network
externalities. It can also facilitate greater price efficiency by
promoting stronger, more effective exchange oversight.
But consolidation has serious drawbacks. In particular, it
encourages a monopoly—or an oligopoly—in the provision of
trading services. Exchanges are well placed to extract private
rents from users, for example, by charging investors overlyhigh fees, using weak infrastructure or delivering a poor
service. These risks may be particularly salient if exchanges
are constituted as for-profit institutions, seeking to maximize
their returns from a captive base of investors and listed
companies.121
U.S. regulatory policy has sought to navigate the tension
between the benefits of consolidation and its risks by using a
two-pronged approach: (i) to force exchanges to compete not

118
119
120
121

INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE , A NNUAL REPORT, 27–28 (2014).
Damodaran, supra note 42.
Madhavan, supra note 22, at 47–48.
Madhavan, supra note 22, at 47–48; Karmel, supra note 4, at 164–66.
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just with one another but also with different types of trading
centers—non-exchange trading facilities that can also match
buyers and sellers with one another; and (ii) to broadly require
that any investor trading in this system of venues can do so at
the best price.122 By fostering competition to generate the best
price on the system, regulation seeks to create a national
market of individual exchanges and trading venues each
fighting to attract business to their floor.123 They must
compete. But they are also interconnected through strong
informational and transactional linkages that enable investors
to pick and choose where to trade.124
This Part examines the evolution of market structure from
consolidation to its current state of heavy fragmentation.125 It
highlights
the
regulatory
objectives
driving
this
transformation—to encourage competition and to lower
transaction costs—and the real-world realization of these
objectives in a proliferation of trading venues. This Part sets
the basis for questioning how effectively a fragmented market
structure can anchor the kind of exchange oversight
envisioned by statute and policy.
A. The Rationale for Competition
Traditionally, securities would trade on the exchanges on
which they first listed.126 If a Public Company listed its shares
on the NYSE, any investors wishing to buy and sell them in
secondary trading would generally also have to go to the

122 Regulation National Market System Rule 611, Order Protection Rule, 17
CFR 242.611(a)(1) (2005) (stating that trading centers cannot execute a trade at
a price that is worse than one displayed at another venue and thus seeking to
prevent “trade throughs” on a venue whose price is worse than one on display at
another venue). Trading centers are defined broadly to include exchanges as well
as ATS. It is worth noting that NMS Rule 611(b) sets out exemptions to this Rule.
For clarification, see Memorandum from the SEC Division of Trading and Markets
to the SEC Market Structure Advisory Committee (Apr. 30, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/emsac/memo-rule-611-regulation-nms.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YAA9-QXUN].
123 See infra subpart III.A.
124 O’Hara & Ye, supra note 13.
125 This Article uses the term “national market” somewhat loosely and nontechnically to reference the collection of exchanges and alternative trading
platforms that transact in nationally listed securities. It is acknowledged that
Regulation NMS and Regulation ATS use a more technical definition of the
National Market System to emphasize those venues that must report their quotes
into the ticker.
126 For example, NYSE Rule 390 restricted the ability of NYSE members to
trade in NYSE securities off-exchange.
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NYSE.127 This arrangement provided a number of benefits to
the listing exchange. For a start, an exchange could count on
a steady volume of trades, bringing fees, information and
generating network gains.128 In addition, it also ensured the
committed participation of market makers on the venue, to
maintain liquidity and to prevent spikes and crashes in
demand and supply.129 For scholars that consider exchanges
as working most effectively when organized as monopolies, this
state of affairs promoted a market where trading in securities
concentrated naturally in one place.130
But consolidation can also be problematic. Knowing they
will see a reliable stream of listings and secondary trading,
exchanges and dealers can extract rents from their position.131
Exchanges can charge high fees for each transaction. Dealers,
too, can maintain higher spreads than justified. On several
occasions, the NYSE and the Nasdaq acted in ways that either
exhibited or tolerated harmful cartel-like conduct. In a famous
study from the 1990s, Professors William G. Christie and Paul
H. Schultz found that Nasdaq dealers were rounding-up
quoted spreads to the next even-eighths.132 This pointed to an
institutionalized practice of systematic collusion between
dealers to pad of spreads upwards. Elsewhere, the NYSE was
sanctioned for failing to catch its market makers engaged in an
abusive scheme of front-running client orders.133 Market
127 For discussion, see Securities and Exchange Commission Equity Market
Structure Committee, Memorandum, Rule 611 and Regulation NMS, 2-3 (April
2015); Stephen Diamond & Jennifer Kuan, Governance Heterogeneity and
Performance at US Stock Exchanges: Evidence from Regulation NMS 2 (Working
Paper, 2012).
128 See Diamond & Kuan, supra note 127, at 8, 12.
129 On the role of market makers, see Hendrik Bessembinder, Jia Hao &
Michael Lemmon, Why Designate Market Makers? Affirmative Obligations and
Market Quality 3 (Working Paper, 2011). On different models of market making
and their implications, see Katrina Ellis, Roni Michaely & Maureen O’Hara, supra
note 55, at 2290. On market making in the swaps market and the potential for
distorted incentives, see Robert B. Thompson, Market Makers and Vampire Squid:
Regulating Securities Markets after the Financial Meltdown, 89 WASH. U. L. REV.
323 (2011).
130 Diamond & Kuan, supra note 127, at 9; Demsetz, supra note 20.
131 See Prajit Dutta & Ananth Madhavan, Competition and Collusion in Dealer
Markets, 52 J. FIN. 245 (1997) (arguing that dealers have incentives to be
collusive).
132 William G. Christie & Paul H. Schultz, Why Do NASDAQ Market-makers
Avoid Odd-Eighth Quotes, 49 J. FIN. 1813 (1994).
133 Specialists
Stumble,
THE
ECONOMIST
(Apr.
14,
2005),
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2005/04/14/specialistsstumble [https://perma.cc/ED33-LUDJ]; Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges The
New York Stock Exchange with Failing to Police Specialists (Apr. 12, 2005),
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makers, knowing how their clients were going to trade, used
that knowledge to get to the trade first, making the deal more
expensive for the client. The NYSE faced SEC sanction for
failing to catch this wrongdoing between 1999 and 2004.
From an investor-centric perspective, consolidation can
also undermine investor choice. Investors can have varied
preferences regarding how they wish to trade, what they wish
to reveal, or how immediately they wish to transact. For
example, an institutional investor, looking to hide a large block
order, might want to transact away from full-public view, or in
smaller, bit-pieces of securities across many exchanges to
avoid being seen. A mandate to transact on just a handful of
exchanges can force a homogenizing model on a diverse group
of traders that fails to fulfill the many strategic goals that
investors invariably have.134
Regulation has sought to find a fix to the problem of high
investor costs through the creation of a National Market
System.135 Central to its design is the goal of ensuring that
investors anywhere within the System can get the best price
for their trade. They do not have to trade on the exchange on
which the securities are listed—but rather anywhere within the
System that offers the best displayed price.136 While much has
been written about the National Market System and its
shortcomings, its broad policy objective is simple and laudable:
to reduce unnecessary transaction costs and to encourage

https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-53.htm
[https://perma.cc/U8WU9P8H].
134 See Diamond & Kuan, supra note 127, at 10–11.
135 See Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29 § 7, 89 Stat.
97, 111–17; Regulation NMS—National Market System, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-51808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,532 n.300 (June 29, 2005). See also
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, MARKET 2000: A N EXAMINATION OF CURRENT EQUITY
MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 17, 1-3 (1994).
136 See Regulation National Market System Rule 611, Order Protection Rule,
17 CFR 242.611 (2005); Regulation NMS—National Market System, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-51808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,532 n.300 (June 29, 2005);
see also supra note 122 and accompanying text. For an early elaboration of the
core goals of the NMS in 1975, see The Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §78k1(a)(1)(c). For an account of the beginning of the NMS and its structural goals,
see Laura Nyantung Beny, U.S. Secondary Stock Markets: A Survey of Current
Regulatory and Structural Issues and a Reform Proposal to Enhance Competition,
2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 399, 412–20 (2002). It is worth noting that SEC
Commissioner Piwowar has called for a 10-year review of Reg NMS as part of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act, inviting comments on NMS’ effectiveness. See Rick
Archer, SEC Member Invites Comments On Regulation NMS Review, LAW 360,
Sept. 16, 2016 https://www.law360.com/articles/840964/sec-member-invitescomments-on-regulation-nms-review [https://perma.cc/4BE8-33W5].
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price efficiencies within the securities market.137
The centerpiece of the National Market System—in effect,
its core implementing measure—is the Order Protection
Rule.138 This Rule prohibits trading centers from executing an
order at a price that is worse than the best available price
within the System. It allows some exceptions—for example, if
a client gives its broker permission to avoid the Rule. But it
prevents exchanges from requiring that all orders “trade
through” the exchange on which the security is listed at prices
that are worse than what is available in the market.139 In effect,
the Rule breaks the once-thick link between a security and its
home exchange and requires market makers and brokers to
look across exchanges to find the best displayed price. To
ensure that securities can, in fact, be traded on the most costeffective venue, exchanges are required to continuously supply
quotes into a national ticker—the Consolidated Tape.140 The
Tape or Ticker collects quotes from exchanges, aggregates the
data and disseminates the best prices available at a given time
on the national network of exchanges.
B. The Rise of Alternative Trading Venues
Regulatory policy has also sought to solve the problem of
investor choice by encouraging the creation of multiple
exchanges and alternative trading venues.141 There would be
little point to a National Market System—where shares should
trade at the cheapest available price—if it comprised just a
small handful of trading platforms. The national market and
the regulatory goal underlying the Order Protection Rule
presuppose the availability of multiple trading venues.
Without a few competing venues, there would be little incentive
137 See Jonathan R. Macey & David D. Haddock, Shirking at the SEC: The
Failure of the National Market System, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 315, 337-44 (1985);
Norman S. Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets: A Critical Look at the SEC’s
National Market System, 56 N. Y.U. L. REV. 883, 957–58 (1981); U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, MARKET 2000: AN EXAMINATION OF CURRENT EQUITY MARKET
DEVELOPMENTS 17, 1–3 (1994).
138 Regulation National Market System Rule 600, 17 CFR 242.600; Regulation
National Market System Rule 611, 17 CFR 242.611.
139 See Xiang Cai, Treading through Trade-Through: A Law and Economics
Analysis of SEC Proposed Regulation NMS 3–7 (Working Paper, 2005).
140 Consolidated
Tape
Association,
Overview,
available
at,
https://www.ctaplan.com/index [https://perma.cc/8KH7-75S6].
141 See Regulation NMS—National Market System, Exchange Act Release No.
34-51808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,532 n.300 (June 29, 2005) (noting the
introduction of the “Order Protection Rule” to modernize and strengthen the
regulatory structure of the U.S. equity markets).
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for dominant exchanges to reduce their prices or to create
conditions that offer varied services to investors.142
SEC rulemaking has deliberately favored competition as a
policy preference in market design.143 Regulation Alternative
Trading Systems (Reg ATS) allows venues to trade nationally
listed securities without requiring to be formally authorized as
a Section 6 exchange under the Securities and Exchange
Act.144 Under Reg ATS, broker-dealers can set up venues to
match buyers and sellers—essentially performing what would
be regarded as an exchange-like function—without requiring
to be authorized as an exchange.145 This means that brokerdealers can establish private platforms to transact in securities
or build their own communication networks to connect
investors without having to go through an exchange first.146
Reg ATS permits broker-dealers to enjoy considerable latitude
in their ability to establish non-exchange trading mechanisms,
expanding investor choice and reducing transaction costs.147
Importantly, ATS have operated within a much lighter
regulatory regime than traditional exchanges. Unlike Section
6 exchanges, subject to extensive obligations to ensure fair
(but exacting) entry onto their venues, continuous price
See id.
See id. at 503 (noting that the information sharing will provide a starting
point to promote visibility and competition on the part of market centers and
broker-dealers).
144 Regulation ATS—Alternative Trading Systems, 17 C.F. R. § 242.300(a)
(2015), giving an exemption under Securities Exchange Act Rule 3a1-1(a)(2) from
registering as a full exchange under Section 6 of the Securities Exchange Act.
145 Rule 300(a) of Reg ATS states that an ATS is: “(a) . . . any organization,
association, person, group of persons, or system: (1) That constitutes, maintains,
or provides a market place or facilities for bringing together purchasers and
sellers of securities or for otherwise performing with respect to securities the
functions commonly performed by a stock exchange within the meaning of §
240.3b-16 of this chapter; and (2) That does not: (i) Set rules governing the
conduct of subscribers other than the conduct of such subscribers’ trading on
such organization, association, person, group of persons, or system; or (ii)
Discipline subscribers other than by exclusion from trading.”
146 O’Hara & Ye, supra note 13, at 1–2 (noting the variety of off-exchange
venues, including electronic communication networks). On larger questions and
trends towards disintermediation, as facilitated by technological innovation, see
Chris Brummer, Disruptive Technology and Securities Regulation, 84 FORDHAM L.
REV 977, 1024 (2015).
147 Regulation ATS—Alternative Trading Systems, 17 C.F. R. § 242.300(a)
(2015) (“The final rules seek to establish a regulatory framework that makes sense
both for current and future securities markets. This regulatory framework
should encourage market innovation while ensuring basic investor
protections . . . In general, this approach gives securities markets a choice to
register as exchanges, or to register as broker-dealers and comply with
Regulation ATS.”).
142
143
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disclosure and the duty to ensure market oversight, ATS face
a far lighter regulatory burden.148
Key Regulatory Characteristics: First, Reg ATS requires
trading platforms to register as an Alternative Trading System
(ATS) with the SEC.149 As part of this process, ATS must
provide disclosure regarding the core terms on which the ATS
intends to operate. ATS can vary widely in type and offer
investors a diverse range of services. For example, the
Investors Exchange (or IEX), made famous by Michael Lewis’
Flash Boys and operating as an ATS until June 2016 when it
gained recognition as an exchange, subjects all incoming
orders to a 350-microsecond delay.150 As outlined by the IEX,
its platform is designed to reduce the systemic advantages
enjoyed by high-frequency traders on national exchanges and
allay investor concerns about losing out to this select cohort of
traders.151
ATS terms of operation are critical to setting regulatory
and investor expectations. In January 2016, the SEC and the
Attorney General for New York fined Barclays for false
advertising in relation to its ATS. Regulators found that
Barclays had misrepresented the terms on which it ran its ATS.
Investors believed that they would be trading on an ATS that
did not include aggressive high frequency traders. Barclays,
however, did seem to allow such HFTs to transact with its
clients, negating a key aspect of the why these investors were

See National securities exchanges, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (2015).
17 C.F.R. § 242.300(a) (2015).
150 The IEX is the latest exchange recognized to become a full Section 6
Exchange. Securities and Exchange Commission, Investors’ Exchange, LLC;
Notice of Filing of Application, as Amended, for Registration as a National
Securities Exchange under Section 6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Release No. 34-75925 (Sept. 15, 2015); Michael Lewis, supra note 37.
151 Order anticipation strategies might work as follows: If a large order from
an Informed Hedge Fund for Public Company shares enters the NYSE, an HFT
trader might react to this information by rapidly purchasing shares on the NYSE
and other available shares on the NYSE, BATS or other exchanges. After
purchasing these shares, the HFT can then re-sell them to the Informed Hedge
Fund at a slightly higher price. In this way, the Hedge Fund pays a higher price
in the presence of the HFT anticipator. For a discussion of HFT and common
trading strategies including anticipation, see Yadav, Algorithmic Trading, supra
note 68, at 116–19. On the economic effects of order anticipation by HFT traders,
see Nicholas H. Hirschey, Do High Frequency Traders Anticipate Buying and
Selling Pressure 31 (Working Paper, 2018) (noting that HFT’s consistently
anticipate informed orders). On the IEX exchange, see IEX Trading Alert 023
(Nov.
3
2013),
http://www.iextrading.com/trading/alerts/2014/023/
[http://perma. cc/8WAR-SRAQ];
IEX,
About
IEX,
http://www.iextrading.com/about/ [http://perma.cc/5SYQ-HS83].
148
149
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choosing to transact on its dark pool.152
Perhaps unsurprisingly given this scandal, the SEC
tightened disclosure requirements for ATS in mid-2018,
requiring venues to be more transparent about the terms of an
ATS operation, how they handle orders and any potential
conflicts of interest that may impact investors.153
Second, notwithstanding this recent rulemaking, ATS are
generally subject to much lower transparency and other
regulatory requirements than regular exchanges. The National
Market System demands that exchanges supply a continuous
flow of buy-and-sell quotes into the Ticker to generate a best
price on the Market.
ATS operate in a quite different regulatory environment.
An ATS that represents less than 5% of trading volume in a
publicly listed stock in the national market (referred to here as
a “Common” ATS) does not have to publish its quotes on the
Ticker.154 This 5% threshold is not especially exacting. While
an ATS might perhaps end up executing over 5% in any single
security, this is not easy. Moreover, it is not in the interest of
an ATS to cross this 5% threshold and become subject to
higher regulatory and reporting requirements.155
Post-trade public reporting requirements for such ATS are
also subject to delays. Broadly, with respect to post-trade
information regarding NMS stock, the self-regulatory
152 Keri Geiger & Sam Mamudi, Barclays, Credit Suisse Agree to Dark Pools
Settlements,
BLOOMBERG,
Jan.
31,
2016
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-31/barclays-creditsuisse-to-pay-154-3-million-in-dark-pool-deals [https://perma.cc/T9DB-SL5D];
William Alden, New York Attorney General Adds to Lawsuit Over Barclays Dark
Pool,
N. Y.
TIMES,
Jan.
21,
2015
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/01/21/new-york-attorney-general-addsto-lawsuit-over-barclays-dark-pool/ [https://perma.cc/3JGY-57ZJ].
153 Rule 304 Regulation ATS—Alternative Trading Systems, 17 C.F.R. §
242.304. This Rule also subjects submissions to a review by the SEC. The SEC
must declare the submission to be effective. For discussion, see James R. Burns
et al., SEC Adopts New Rules to Enhance Public Disclosure of Information and
Regulatory Oversight of Alternative Trading Systems, WILKIE FARR & GALLAGHER
LLP
(July
23,
2018),
https://www.willkie.com/~/media/Files/Publications/2018/07/SEC_Adopts_N
ew_Rules_to_%20Enhance_Public_Disclosure_of_Information.pdf
[https://perma.cc/646H-ZUYH].
154 17 CFR § 242.301(b)(3) (describing requirements for alternative trading
systems).
155 It should be noted that electronic communication networks or ECNs
expressly post their quotes to the feed. ECNs are ATS whose design is based on
posting their current quotes to the market. See, e.g., Gary Shorter & Rena S.
Miller, Dark Pools in Equity Trading: Policy Concerns and Recent Developments,
Congressional Research Service, 1–2 (Sept. 2014) (describing ECNs).
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organization, FINRA makes aggregate data available to the
public with a minimum delay of two weeks for certain NMS
securities and four weeks in the case of others.156 Within the
trading day, ATS send details of concluded trades to FINRA
within 10 seconds of execution.157
ATS thus represent a paradigm shift from traditional
exchanges: pre-trade, these ATS do not have to display their
pre-trade quotes. And post-trade, information appears in the
public domain with delays that, while shrinking, are out-ofsync with modern high-speed, microsecond-driven trading
practices on public exchanges. Because of this more blackbox approach, ATS are colloquially termed “dark pools,” venues
on which price transparency is limited.158
Thirdly, ATS carry far lighter responsibilities for
monitoring, discipline and oversight. ATS are not mandated to
exercise the level of oversight expected of Section 6
exchanges.159 For one, ATS are heavily circumscribed in their
ability to set rules for overseeing their venues. Common ATS
are not subject to requirements to establish fair and
reasonable access to their venues, as national exchanges
must. This can allow ATS to be choosier about who can use
their venue. ATS oversight can only apply narrowly to their
subscribers’ conduct on the venue itself—and not more
broadly.
This means that ATS cannot regulate core
institutional features about their subscribers—like financial
resources, employee qualifications, or books and record
keeping. Importantly, ATS can only punish their subscribers

156 See Update: Alternative Trading System Transparency Trade Report File
Submission,
FINRA
(Jan.
12,
2016),
https://www.finra.org/industry/ats/update-alternative-trading-systemtransparency-trade-report-file-submission
[https://perma.cc/R66A-W56N].
This update amended old FINRA Rule 4552 that required ATS to report weekly
aggregate stock trading volumes to FINRA. See Trade Reporting Frequently Asked
Questions, Section 102: Timely Submission of Trade Report Information, FINRA,
http://www.finra.org/industry/trade-reporting-faq#102
[https://perma.cc/A6DQ-AV5E] (last updated Oct. 15, 2018); FINRA, Proposed
Change
to
Rule
4552,
http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/RuleFiling/p354143.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4UVP-ERNS].
157 Trade Reporting Frequently Asked Questions, Section 102: Timely Submission
of Trade Report Information, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/industry/tradereporting-faq#102 [https://perma.cc/A6DQ-AV5E] (last updated Oct. 15, 2018).
158 See Shorter & Miller, supra note 155, at 1–2. Note that this statement
does not apply to electronic communication networks (ECNs) that post their
quotes to the consolidated feed.
159 Regulation ATS—Alternative Trading Systems, 17 C.F. R. § 242.300
(2015).
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by excluding them from the venue, rather than deploying the
sliding scale of disciplinary levers usual to exchanges. With a
much weaker mandate (and power) to control the institutional
and behavioral conduct of subscribers, ATS can enjoy lower
regulatory costs.
Informational and Transactional Links: The interplay of the
Order Protection Rule and Regulation ATS transforms the
informational and transactional architecture of the
marketplace.
The Order Protection Rule requires that
investors trade shares at the best displayed price within the
National Market.160 Regulation ATS helps expand the range of
trading venues available to investors, giving them enormous
choice about where they wish to trade and what factors are
important to them when they enter the marketplace (e.g., do
they wish to trade with HFTs?).161 The Order Protection Rule
and Regulation ATS have thus resulted in the creation of a
fragmented but operationally interconnected market.
Information must flow freely and rapidly across the
market, not just to exchanges but also to ATS. For prices to
be competitive, exchanges must continuously update their
quotes and to transmit them across the market.
The
Consolidated Tape (or Ticker) organizes this process of
collecting,
updating
and
distributing
information.162
Importantly, even if ATS are not directly supplying fresh quotes
to the Ticker, they still need to receive information to
benchmark prices on their venue. If they charge significantly
higher prices than what is available on public exchanges, then
investors will have little motivation to enter an ATS.
Information constitutes a critical resource that is necessary to
assure regulatory compliance with the Order Protection Rule.
In turn, it connects venues in the market to one another.
Markets are also connected to each other through hard
transactional channels. Because of the Order Protection Rule,
trading centers constantly supply quotes to compete on
offering the best price. With many venues available, investors,
brokers and market makers must build responsive links to
exchanges and ATS in order to route their orders to the
160 Regulation National Market System Rule 600, 17 CFR 242.600; Regulation
National Market System Rule 611, 17 CFR 242.611.
161 Regulation ATS—Alternative Trading Systems, 17 C.F. R. § 242.300
(2015).
162 Regulation ATS—Alternative Trading Systems, 17 C.F. R. § 242.300(a)
(2)(1)-(2); 242.301(b)(5) (2015); Consolidated Tape Association, Overview,
available at, https://www.ctaplan.com/index [https://perma.cc/8KH7-75S6].
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exchange or ATS that promises to give their clients the best
price or specifically desired services.163 In this way, traders
and information can move quickly and fluidly across the
network of exchanges and ATS.
C. The Structural Impact of Competition
Regulation ATS and the Order Protection Rule have
transformed the structure of securities markets.
Most
obviously, the number of exchanges and exchange-like venues
has mushroomed. By some estimates, the market comprises
as many as 14 public exchanges and around 40 or so active
dark pools.164
This proliferation of venues has dramatically impacted the
volume of business that flows to public exchanges. Scholars
report that the NYSE’s virtual monopoly in secondary trading
in stock listed on its venue has dwindled since the
implementation of the Order Protection Rule in 2005, falling
from 80% to 34% in just three years.165 In their study on equity
fragmentation, Professors O’Hara and Mao Ye Report observe
that more than 50% of all equity volume trades away from its
home exchange, with off-exchange venues (e.g., dark pools)
handling 30% of all equity volume.166 Some estimates suggest
that this figure is higher, positing that dark pools now account
for almost 35-40% of equity trading volume.167 To appreciate
the structural depth of this fragmentation, it is worth briefly

163 See, e.g., Markus K. Brunnermeier & Lasse H. Pedersen, Market Liquidity
& Funding Liquidity, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2201, 2202–04 (2009) (noting the ability
of market makers to transact across multiple venues).
164 John McCrank, Dark Markets May Be More Harmful than High Frequency
Trading, REUTERS, Apr. 7, 2014. On the rising number of dark pools, see
McCrank, supra note 24. In 2019, the SEC approved the application of the Long
Term Stock Exchange to become a national exchange, making it the fourteenth
such exchange however, at the time of writing, it has yet to fully launch its
operations. See Theodore Schleifer, America’s Newest Stock Exchange Wants to
Fix One of Capitalism’s Fundamental Challenges, V OX (May 22, 2019, 1:00 PM),
https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/5/22/18629621/long-term-stockexchange-explainer-capitalism-quarterly-earnings
[https://perma.cc/EL2K5MBK].
165 Diamond & Kuan, supra note 127, at 2.
166 O’Hara & Ye, supra note 13, at 2–5.
167 See BATS, supra note 15; see also Arash Massoudi & Michael Mackenzie,
Stock Exchanges Seek to Stem the Tide of Dark Trading, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2013.
It is interesting that on a day of extreme market stress (August 24, 2015), dark
pool volume fell, with investors moving to exchanges where they could better
ensure they were able to get their desired trades done. Sam Mamudi, Dark Pools
Were the Losers as U. S. Markets Saw Volume Spurt, B LOOMBERG, Aug. 24, 2015;
SIFMA, supra note 21, at 12–16.
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examining two inquiries: (i) what types of ATS operate in the
market?; and (ii) why do investors wish to trade in dark venues
over lit ones?
Types of ATS: Perhaps the distinguishing feature of ATS
lies in their sheer variety. Broadly, ATS can be divided into
three categories.168
First, some ATS represent communication networks that
connect buyers and sellers with each other.169 For example, a
Hedge Fund might post its interest to buy 100 shares of Public
Company on an electronic communication network. A Mutual
Fund can respond to that interest by offering to sell these
shares to the Hedge Fund. These communication networks
facilitate customer-to-customer trading, eliminating the
middleman and providing investors with a lower cost option
than on an exchange. If investors are large institutions, and
enough of them participate in the network, using
communication networks can reduce the fees they usually pay
for trading.170
Secondly, ATS can facilitate large block trading of shares.
Specialized dark pools can help investors to dispose of sizable
chunks of shares whose trading may reveal too much
information about strategy—and cause too big a splash in the
public marketplace.171
Thirdly, dark pools can also provide a venue to match
shares, just as an exchange might. Rather than sending
orders to an exchange, where an investor must pay exchange
fees, brokers can instead send these into a dark pool that offers
special services that a customer likes or lower charges. This
reflects the kind of model adopted by the Barclay’s dark pool,
whose terms of service (ostensibly) gave investors an
opportunity to avoid predatory high frequency traders.172 The
168 See Haoxiang Zhu, Do Dark Pools Harm Price Discovery, Trading, 27 REV.
FIN. STUD. 747, 749–54 (2014).
169 McCrank, supra note 24.
170 See Michael J. Barclay, Terrence Hendershott & D. Timothy McCormick,
Electronic Communication Networks & Market Quality 2–5 (Working Paper, 2001).
171 See Markus Brunnermeier & Lars Pedersen, Predatory Trading, 60 J. FIN.
1825 (2005) (noting that investors that show how they intend to trade are
vulnerable to being picked off by predatory traders).
172 See Keri Geiger & Sam Mamudi, Barclays, Credit Suisse Agree to Dark
Pools
Settlements,
BLOOMBERG,
Jan.
31,
2016
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-31/barclays-creditsuisse-to-pay-154-3-million-in-dark-pool-deals [https://perma.cc/T9DB-SL5D];
William Alden, New York Attorney General Adds to Lawsuit Over Barclays Dark
Pool,
N. Y.
TIMES,
Jan.
21,
2015
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/01/21/new-york-attorney-general-adds-
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IEX (when it was an ATS) marketed itself as an option where a
mandatory time delay helped equalize the playing field between
HFT and other investors. It is worth noting that orders
processed by dark pools represent, on average, a fairly ordinary
and small number of shares (in one study, 256 shares per
trade)—rather than large blocks that may be better off being
traded off-exchange.173 Put simply, given these relatively small
orders being traded, investors are choosing to trade in a dark
pool, rather than on a public exchange.
Why Trade Off-Exchange? At first glance, theory would
predict that investors will choose to trade on a public exchange
and not elsewhere. The benefits generated by networks of
users in terms of high liquidity and low transaction costs
should mean that investors will gravitate towards public
exchanges and not off-exchange venues.
This, however, is not the case in modern markets, or even
historically.
Scholars have long puzzled over this
conundrum—why, despite positive network externalities, do
investors still choose to trade outside of the most deeply
networked venues? One explanation, as Professor Madhavan
suggests, lies in the varied needs and preferences of a
heterogeneous population of investors in U.S. markets with
different tolerance for transaction costs.174
First, noted above, ATS offer anonymity to those that wish
to trade on them. Regulation ATS does not require Common
ATS to publish their pre-trade quotes, and post-trade reporting
is subject to delays. Unlike an exchange, trading within dark
pools occurs within the confines of the venue itself.
Subscribers to the dark pool might garner information about
the dark pool operator itself and its terms of trading. Beyond
this mandatory disclosure, however, regulation has expressly
created pockets within the market for listed securities to
transact with much lower transparency.175
This anonymity might suit traders that want to safeguard
the value of their information. The longer their information

to-lawsuit-over-barclays-dark-pool/ [https://perma.cc/3JGY-57ZJ].
173 See Frank Hatheway, Amy Kwan & Hui Zheng, An Empirical Analysis of
Market Segmentation on U.S. Equities Markets 3–5 (Working Paper, 2014).
According to SIFMA, the average trade size for equity ATS is 204. SIFMA, supra
note 21, at 18.
174 Madhavan, supra note 22, at 47–48.
175 See, e.g., Hatheway, Kwan & Zheng, supra note 173, at 3–5 (show that
dark venues successfully segment the market and attract uninformed order flow).
On ATS disclosure rules, see Reg ATS Rule 304, 17 C.F.R. § 242.304.
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remains hidden, the better their chances to make money. This
rationale, for example, appears to explain investor interests in
dark pools that limit the activity of high frequency traders—
commonly viewed as adept in anticipating and trading ahead
of informed investors.176
Anonymity can also explain why traders interested in
disposing or acquiring large blocks of shares might move
towards dark pools. Dark pools can facilitate block trading, for
example if traders strategically transact small amounts across
several platforms. Even on just one platform, a skilled broker
can execute the order in a piecemeal way over time to avoid
detection. In this way, ATS can offer a meaningful service by
helping investors to transact in blocks without giving away
their intention and reducing their impact on the market.177
Anonymity can, of course, also attract bad apples. Some
investors may be incentivized to transact on dark pools
because they will avoid being discovered in their intent to
manipulate or deceive others. ATS are subject to a far lower
burden in terms of exercising market oversight than
exchanges. Under Regulation ATS, operators are limited to
prescribing rules to cover behavior that takes place just on
their specific venue. Further, their disciplinary power lies only
in exclusion. Within these parameters, dark pool operators are
likely to exercise discipline only when they absolutely have to
do so. If the only option available to a dark pool operator is
exclusion—losing traders that generate business and fees—the
motivation to monitor bad behavior is likely to be heavily
circumscribed.
Secondly, investors may shift their business to dark pools
in order to benefit from lower transaction costs and fees. When
trading on an exchange, investors can enjoy network benefits,
but they also face costs, notably in the form of fees and
spreads. ATS and communication networks can compete
aggressively with exchanges on transaction costs because their
regulatory obligations are significantly fewer than those faced
by regular exchanges.178
And as part of these limited
See Yadav, Algorithmic Trading, supra note 68, at 1629.
See Hatheway, Kwan & Zheng, supra note 173, at 4–6.
178 For example, the SEC has explored whether to change regulations relating
to tick size and pricing. Regulation National Market System Rule 612, 17 CFR
242.612. The SEC undertook a pilot to test whether this Rule ought to be
amended. For details of the study that ended in September 2018, see Press
Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Approves Pilot to Assess Tick
Size
Impact
for
Smaller
Companies
(May
6,
2015),
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-82.html
[perma.cc/QZ83176
177
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obligations, dark pools do not have to conform as strictly to the
usual
pricing
regulations
that
normally
constrain
179
exchanges.
As Professors Ronald W. Masulis, Amy Kwan
and Thomas H. McInish note, greater flexibility in relation to
pricing rules has meaningfully boosted the competitiveness of
dark pools versus exchanges.180 With more traders entering
dark pools, ATS can replicate some of the network effects
common to exchanges.181
In summary, regulatory policy—in favoring competition
over consolidation—has rapidly transformed the architecture
of markets. From a handful of dominant trading venues, as
was once the case, equity transactions in the U.S. are
fragmented across around 50+ exchanges and dark pools.182
This focus on competition, however, creates a fundamental
schism in policy, raising serious questions about whether
exchanges can continue to fulfil their role as private regulators
in the securities markets.
III

M8C5]; Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, Order Directing the
Exchanges and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority to Submit a Tick Size
Pilot Plan (June 24, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2014/3472460.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RKY-7M8M]; Press Release, Securities and
Exchange Commission, Statement on the Expiration of the Tick Size Pilot (Sept.
10, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/tm-dera-expirationtick-size-pilot [https://perma.cc/R2NU-LVGX].
179 See, e.g., Nathaniel Popper, As Markets Heat Up, Trading Moves into
Shadows, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2013 (noting that dark pools are generally
cheaper) https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/01/business/as-market-heatsup-trading-slips-into-shadows.html [https://perma.cc/5HSN-UY2H].
180 Amy Kwan, Ronald W. Masulis & Thomas H. McInish, Trading Rules,
Competition for Order Flow and Market Fragmentation, 115 J. FIN. ECON. 330
(2015). See also Robert P. Bartlett III & Justin McCrary, Dark Trading at the
Midpoint: Pricing Rules, Order Flow and Price Discovery 1 (Working Paper, 2015)
(noting that sub-penny pricing allows queue-jumping by traders that can damage
liquidity on public exchanges).
181 In particular, dark pools have had more latitude in relation to quoting
prices within the penny to offer sub-penny price improvements. On the
permissibility of sub-penny price improvements, see Securities and Exchange
Commission, Division of Market Regulation: Responses to Frequently Asked
Questions Concerning Rule 612 (Minimum Pricing Increment) of Regulation NMS,
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/subpenny612faq.htm
[http://perma. cc/TS6U-KJ4C].
182 On the question of how this fragmentation impacts market quality see, for
example, Hatheway, Kwan & Zheng, supra note 173, at 3–5; Zhu, supra note 168,
at 749–54; Sabrina Buti, Barbara Rindi & Ingrid M. Werner, Diving into Dark
Pools 2–3 (Working Paper, 2010) (noting the characteristics of the stock that is
traditionally traded on dark pools). See also Kwan, Masulis & McInish, supra
note 180 (noting the potential for liquidity to be fragmented).
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THE DECLINING POWER OF EXCHANGE OVERSIGHT
This Part examines the impact of competition and
fragmentation on the ability of exchanges to oversee markets.
Exchanges have long faced skepticism regarding their
institutional capacity to perform this supervisory role.
Scholars have questioned whether for-profit institutions can
really properly perform the public service of policing.183
Consolidated venues can also deliver poor oversight owing to
rent-seeking incentives.184
This Part shows that fragmentation creates an entirely new
challenge beyond the usual criticisms that exchanges have
faced in the past. Owing to fragmentation and the pressure to
compete alongside lightly regulated platforms, exchanges are
severely weakened logistically and institutionally in their
capacity to deliver oversight. Further, in an operationally
interconnected market, competition introduces the risk that
exchanges underinvest in governance because they can
internalize private gains from weak discipline, while
externalizing a part of the costs to other, competing exchanges
and dark pools.
A. The High Costs of Exchange Oversight
Oversight is expensive.185 Regulators confront a multitude
of costs. To monitor markets, detect bad behavior and to
punish mistake, manipulation, fraud and disruption,
overseers must devote significant resources to the task. These
include not just the finances necessary to support the
infrastructure for oversight, but also time, expertise and
reputational investment to signal quality and commitment to
the task.186
183 See Fleckner & Hopt, supra note 36; Kahan, supra note 85; Karmel, supra
note 4. For a comparison of incentives between mutual, member-owned
incentives and for-profit institutions, see Pirrong, supra note 45.
184 Notably, in the examples heighted earlier, the MF Global and Flash Crash
debacles, allegedly originating on the CME, as well as the CBOE infraction,
occurred on consolidated venues for the trading of derivatives.
185 See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, FISCAL YEAR 2014 A GENCY
REPORT (2014), 35–43. For discussion on budgetary issues, see Donald C.
Langevoort, Managing the Expectations Gap in Investor Protection: the SEC and
the Post-Enron Agenda, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1139, 1143 (2003). See also Howell E.
Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws:
Resource-Based Evidence, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 207, 208 (2009) (noting the regulatory
intensity and costs of public-private investment in the U.S.).
186 See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, FISCAL YEAR 2014 A GENCY
REPORT (2014), 35–43 (noting investment in hi-tech data, economic analyses and
projected technological investment).
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Statute places express responsibility on exchanges to
monitor and discipline those that utilize the exchange for
listing and trading.187 This task is resource intensive for an
exchange seeking to perform it effectively.
For a start,
exchanges need to invest in building the systems necessary for
detailed monitoring and surveillance.188 Commentators have
highlighted the rising costs of this charge, fueled by
exponential growth in technology and the data-intensity of
modern, high-tech, high-speed markets.189
In addition to surveillance, exchanges must also invest in
enforcing discipline. This is tricky. As discussed above,
exchanges face a conflict when called upon to discipline the
traders and companies from which they derive their revenue.
As for-profit firms, dependent on traders and listed companies
for their business, it is easy to see why exchanges would think
twice before taking action to punish paying customers.
Exchanges have sought institutional workarounds to deal
with this conflict. In some cases, they have established
separate legal entities—distinct from the exchange itself—to
carry out the actual business of punishing violations. The
NYSE, for example, has established NYSE Regulation, a notfor-profit subsidiary of the NYSE that is charged with leading
the exchange’s enforcement efforts.190 In addition, exchanges
have outsourced—to varying degrees—their oversight
responsibilities to the Financial Industry Regulatory
Association (FINRA), the self-regulatory organization for
broker-dealers. Instead of enforcing breaches themselves,
exchanges can delegate an allocation of this task to FINRA.191
15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b)(1), (b)(6).
See Securities and Exchange Commission, Consolidated Audit Trail,
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/rule613-info.htm
[https://perma.cc/89JC-72X]; Christian T. Brownlees & Giampiero M. Gallo,
Financial Econometric Analysis at Ultra–High Frequency: Data Handling Concerns
(Università di Firenze, Dipartimento di Statistica G. Parenti, Working Paper No.
2006-3, 2006).
189 See Capgemini, Trends in the Global Capital Markets Industry 2012:
Financial Intermediary Firms, 8–10 (2012); Brownlees & Gallo, supra note 188, at
15–17.
190 NYSE,
NYSE
REGULATION,
https://www.nyse.com/regulation
[http://perma. cc/9UZF-BWUV].
191 See Sheppard Mullin, Forward to the Past: NYSE Returns to Regulation,
Nov.
23,
2015,
http://www.governmentcontractslawblog.com/2015/11/articles/regulations/f
orward-to-the-past-nyse-returns-to-regulation/ [http://perma.cc/LEF5-JVWE];
John McCrank, Wall Street Watchdog FINRA to Monitor BATS’ Markets, REUTERS,
Feb. 6, 2015. It is worth highlighting that the NYSE took back its allocation to
the FINRA, such that NYSE Regulation became charged with enforcement,
187
188
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The solution is far from perfect—particularly as some
observers have noted shortcomings in FINRA’s enforcement
intensity.192 However, it offers a mechanism to blunt, in part,
the perceived conflict of interests embedded in the notion of
exchange oversight.
Fragmentation, however, further increases the costs of
oversight, and diminishes the incentives of exchanges to invest
in it. First, fragmentation raises the per-trade costs of policing,
reducing the financial motivation to perform this task
effectively.
Historically, exchanges have been well placed to recoup the
costs of monitoring and discipline on account of consolidation.
They hosted public listings as well as dominated secondary
trading in listed securities. With exchanges guaranteed to see
listing fees, trading volume, as well as reputational capital,
investment in oversight made sense. Exchanges could privately
reap the benefits. If they performed diligently in this context,
then they could enjoy the fruits of a job well done. Listed
companies would be sounder economic prospects and traders
better behaved, attracting more investors and public
companies to the venue.193
These advantages break down in a fragmented market.
Exchanges see deeply diminished volumes of traders on their
venue, reducing fees and trading business. Both the NYSE and
the Nasdaq have witnessed sharp reductions in their trading
market share. When the NYSE suffered its four-hour outage
in July 2015, the market hardly reacted, with traffic diverted
easily to other exchanges and dark pools. According to one
commentator, this absence of panic reflected NYSE’s sharply
reduced share of overall equity volume, sometimes hovering
around the 1% mark during the day, with activity only
intensifying at the beginning and close of trading.194
Lower market share poses a problem for exchanges. The
cost of their oversight infrastructure must be supported by the
activities of a much smaller reserve of traders. Exchanges
must pay a steady, fixed cost for overseeing the marketplace

effective January 1, 2016.
192 See Andrew Tuch, The Self-Regulation of Investment Bankers, 83 GEO. W.
L. REV. 101, 137–40 (2015) (observing that FINRA’s actions against investment
bankers were relatively few).
193 See Mahoney, supra note 19; Pritchard, supra note 83.
194 Phillip Stafford, Shrinking Trading Floor Does Not Reduce NYSE’s Influence,
FIN. TIMES, July 16, 2015 https://www.ft.com/content/f1ec9d80-2a15-11e58613-e7aedbb7bdb7 [https://perma.cc/4R6E-T6N4].
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through infrastructure and institutional mechanisms built for
the task—as well as ongoing monitoring and discipline. Their
returns from this investment, however, are much lower given
the reduced, uncertain volume of trading business.
Indeed, the returns of oversight are lower in fragmented
markets also because exchanges face higher costs to obtain
information from other venues and to coordinate in monitoring
and discipline. Competition encourages traders to shop for the
best deal. To the extent that traders are strategically choosing
where to trade at any given time, their decision-making
increases the information costs that exchanges must bear in
monitoring traffic. Instead of relying on a regular set of repeat
players in a consolidated market, whose habits, behavior and
strategies can be tracked over time, fragmentation creates a
more fluid set of actors coming to the venue and taking their
business to multiple platforms. Patchy information on a
shifting set of traders makes it harder for exchanges to
establish and understand patterns of behavior. To the extent
that exchanges see steadily lower volumes and reduced
revenues from trading, the motivation to spend on such
analysis will likely grow less compelling.
Secondly, within a fragmented market, exchanges do not
internalize the full benefits of their investment in oversight.
Rather, competitors reap these gains. Put simply, other
exchanges and dark pools can free ride off the efforts of a
diligent exchange.
Competitively, exchanges must absorb the lion’s share of
the costs of oversight. ATS face light obligations when it comes
to policing. They set rules to regulate the behavior of traders
on their venue and nothing more and can only really discipline
by excluding users.195 Moreover, ATS can always rely on
exchanges to police traders and save themselves time and
money in the process.
This profoundly uneven distribution of oversight costs
might appear reasonable at first sight. Theory suggests that
exchanges should see more volume given the strength of their
networks and the attractions of transparency and oversight.
Also, individual dark pools benefit by keeping volumes below
the 5% volume threshold in order to utilize the lighter
regulatory regime.196 On this basis, requiring that exchanges
carry the greater regulatory burden makes sense, given that
195
196

See discussion supra subsections II.B–C.
See supra note 152.
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they should have broader sight of traders and more to lose if
something goes wrong. However, this rationale breaks down
in practice. While individual dark pools may try to keep within
the 5% limit, exchange volumes too routinely fall below or trade
around this limit.197 Moreover, by requiring exchanges to bear
a higher cost (that they might pass onto their customers),
regulation can create incentives for investors to move into
cheaper dark pools.
Thirdly, higher regulatory costs per trade and an uneven
distribution of regulatory costs between ATS and exchanges
deepen the conflicts of interests that have always afflicted
exchanges. Scholars have long highlighted the basic conflict
of interest underlying exchange oversight.198 Exchanges must
discipline the very traders and companies that represent their
source of revenue, market share and reputation. As for-profit
institutions, exchanges face a deep tension in satisfying both
their private accountability to their own shareholders and their
public accountability to the market.199
The pressure created by increased competition and lower
revenues from trading can motivate exchanges to seek out
other sources of profit.
Numerous examples showcase
attempts by exchanges to bridge closer financial ties between
themselves and their users. For instance, it is commonplace
for exchanges to pay traders that bring liquidity to the venue.
Rather than simply charging a flat fee for transactions, venues
can calibrate fees to reflect the benefit (in the form of liquidity)
any particular trader brings to the platform. Exchanges can
pay a trader to “make” trading opportunities by providing this
liquidity for others and can charge a fee from one that “takes”
them.
To illustrate, Trader A submits an order offering to buy 100
shares of Public Company at $100 a share from anyone that
wishes to sell. Trade A is thus providing liquidity. Trader B
wants to sell and takes up Trader A’s offer. Trader B thus takes
liquidity. Instead of charging everyone a flat fee, the exchange
can charge Trader B a fee of 50 cents because she succeeded
in fulfilling her order (taking liquidity).
Meanwhile, the
exchange can pay Trader A a rebate of 30 cents for providing

See Stafford, supra note 194.
See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 85; Karmel, supra note 4; Pirrong, supra note
45. For comparative discussion, see Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 4.
199 See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 85; Karmel, supra note 4; Pirrong, supra note
45. For comparative discussion, see Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 4.
197
198
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this opportunity (providing liquidity).200 Traders that act as
counterparty to others can benefit by receiving a payment from
the exchange, motivating them to step forward and act as a
market maker. For an exchange, the gains come through
recapturing volume and reputation.
More importantly,
exchanges make money from this arrangement. They pocket
the difference between the fees they charge from “takers” and
the money they spend on rebates to pay the “makers” (20
cents, in the above example). The more volume and investors
that exchanges attract, through the promise of traders
standing to trade, the more money the exchange can stand to
make.201
Colloquially
termed
“maker-taker”
fees,
these
arrangements have attracted considerable attention from
scholars and policymakers for their impact on market
quality.202 While analysis of these larger questions is outside
the scope of this Article, these fees highlight a close mutual
dependence between the economic health of exchanges and
high-volume traders.203
In a fragmented, competitive
marketplace, this interdependence heightens existing costs
that exchanges face in enforcing discipline against active,
liquidity supplying traders.
Exchanges lose business;
moreover, their competition gains if this volume moves
elsewhere.
200 This illustration is entirely stylized for ease of describing the phenomenon.
For one, Rule 610 of Regulation NMS caps access fees at 3/10th of a cent per
share for stocks with prices of $1 or more. It should be noted that ATS such as
electronic communication networks can also set maker-taker fees. For
discussion, see Dolgopolov, supra note 28, at 244–45.
201 Theirry Foucault, Ohad Khan & Eugene Kandel, Liquidity Cycles and
Make-Take Fees in Electronic Markets, 68 J. FIN. 299 (2013) (noting the selfreinforcing dynamic between liquidity seekers and liquidity suppliers); SCOTT
PATTERSON, DARK POOLS: THE RISE OF THE MACHINE TRADERS AND THE RIGGING OF
THE STOCK MARKET, 40–45 (2013).
202 See, e.g., Kara M. Stein, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks
Before Trader Forum 2014 Equity Trading Summit (Feb. 6, 2014) ( problematic
aspects of maker-taker fees for investors). For discussion of the controversies
surrounding maker-taker fees and a broad discussion regarding its interface with
securities regulation, see Stanislav Dolgopolov, Maker-Taker Pricing Model and its
Impact on the Securities Market Structure: A Can of Worms for Securities Fraud, 8
VA. L. BUS. REV. 231, 233–37 (2014). See also Dolgopolov, supra note 28. In
response to the Nasdaq and NYSE challenging the SEC’s ability to conduct the
transaction fee pilot program due to the costs it creates for the exchanges, the
SEC announced on March 28, 2019 that the program would be put on
hold. See Order Issuing Stay, Securities and Exchange Commission (March 28,
2019), https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2019/3485447.pdf [https://perma.cc/554V-6LW4].
203 Dolgopolov, supra note 28, at 244–48 (on best execution duty to investors).
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Beyond this fee structure, exchanges also offer a suite of
services that now constitute lucrative sources of revenue.
Exchanges sell data packages, promising more detail and
faster information streams than what is publicly available.204
They sell real estate that secures physical proximity for users
to exchange servers, facilitating speedier trading between the
exchange and trader.205
Tellingly, exchanges even offer
advisory services to users designed to help them comply with
obligations under exchange rules and corporate governance.
Analysts have observed that exchanges have seen their
revenues rise despite the noted fall in exchange volume. In
2014, the NYSE earned $762 million of operating income.
Between 2010 and 2015, the key exchange groups (then
covering the BATS exchanges, NYSE, Nasdaq) were reported to
have seen a rise of 16% in their quarterly revenue, with a 62%
growth in the revenue derived from technology and data
services.206
Entrenched commercial relationships between an
exchange and its users present difficult trade-offs for
exchanges seeking to robustly enforce the rules. The basic
conflict of interest remains: profit-seeking exchanges are likely
to be wary of taking action against major customers. However,
the costs of this conflict may be more tolerable when exchanges
can count on continuing, captive volumes of business as part
of a consolidated market structure. Fragmentation deepens
the conflict of interest. The exchange must think harder about
taking disciplinary action against paying members.
Enforcement can result in exchanges losing customers in an
environment of falling volumes. Moreover, these customers
204 See, e.g., NASDAQ G LOBAL DATA PRODUCTS, TOTAL VIEW FACT SHEET,
http://www.nasdaqtrader. com/content/ProductsServices/DataProducts/Total
View/TotalViewProFactSheet.pdf [http://perma.cc/253P-Q9SV]; NASDAQ U.S.
AND
GLOBAL
DATA
FEEDS,
http://www.nasdaqtrader. com/trader. aspx?id=dpspecs
[http://perma. cc/9VP4-W94X];
NYSE,
DATA
PRODUCTS,
http://www.nyxdata.com/Data-Products/Real-Time-Data
[https://perma.cc/YA7D-M565].
205 See,
e. g . ,
NASDAQ,
CO-LOCATION,
http://www.nasdaqtrader. com/Trader.aspx?id=colo [http://perma.cc/KU4FM932] (“Nasdaq offers all customers the opportunity to co-locate their servers
and equipment within the Nasdaq Data Center, providing proximity to the speed
and liquidity of all of our U.S. markets.”). For discussion on co-location and
proprietary data feeds, see Yadav, Insider Trading, supra note 3.
206 Stafford, supra note 194; Larry Tabb, Stock Exchanges are Eating Your
Returns,
BLOOMBERG,
Jan.
22,
2016
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2016-01-22/stock-exchangesdata-fees-harm-investors [https://perma.cc/US8W-UWAP] .
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can take their business to a competing platform. In addition,
fragmentation encourages exchanges to seek profits by selling
other services, like data and technology. Robust enforcement
can dent these businesses as well.
B. Information Gaps and Coordination Failure
Fragmented markets mean that exchanges face high costs
in monitoring activity on other trading platforms beyond their
own, including more opaque dark pools.
Without this
information, however, exchanges cannot fully determine the
risks on their own venue and the market.
The National Market System aspires to be an essentially
singular economic space for trading securities.207 Through the
Order Protection Rule, the System works to generate a best
price for the market. To make this happen, trading venues are
connected to each other through strong informational as well
as operational links.208 Brokers and dealers should be able to
transact across multiple venues for their clients and attain the
best available price as they do so.
The ability of exchanges to exercise effective oversight faces
a conceptual problem: traders can move easily across the
system. Exchanges, however, can only really monitor activity
on their own venues effectively. This leaves exchanges facing
blind-spots. Though Section 6 may envision a handful of
exchanges safeguarding the securities market, fragmentation
leaves exchanges incapable of doing so logistically, as more
trading migrates to dark pools. With dark pools subject to
much lighter regulatory requirements, exchanges face risks
emanating from potentially riskier, less monitored and less
transparent areas of the market.
These blind spots mean that exchanges face (impossibly)
high information and coordination costs in oversight, making
it much harder for exchanges to detect misconduct and enforce
securities rules. For instance, statute requires exchanges to
prevent fraudulent and manipulative behavior. Fulfilling this
mandate is especially difficult where traders can transact
across a variety of venues with different degrees of regulation
207 Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29 § 7, 89 Stat. 97,
111–17; Regulation NMS—National Market System, Exchange Act Release No.
34-51808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,532 n.300 (June 29, 2005) (“In 1975,
Congress directed the Commission, through enactment of Section 11A of the
Exchange Act, to facilitate the establishment of a national market system to link
together the multiple individual markets that trade securities.”).
208 Gerig, supra note 35.
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and transparency. A fraudster may seek to escape detection
by trading through a dark pool. If she wishes to trade, she can
buy or sell her tainted shares on a dark pool with limited
transparency.209 If this fraudster also trades on an exchange,
it is difficult for the exchange to track her trading, find out
about her bad activities on the dark pool and to discipline her.
Similarly, a trader intent on manipulating markets may
strategically engage in a kind of “supervisory arbitrage”
between transparent exchanges and opaque dark pools. For
instance, she might split her orders between an exchange and
a dark pool. She might submit a series of “sell” orders for
Public Company shares on an exchange, depressing the
market price. Following this, she can go to a dark pool and
purchase Public Company shares at the artificially depressed
price without necessarily alerting the exchange or other
traders.210 Eventually, the shares of Public Company should
return to their “efficient” price. When that happens, she can
sell the shares on the dark pool at the higher price. Limited
pre-trade transparency and delayed post-trade transparency
on the dark pool makes it harder to connect the dots and
determine whether a violation of exchange rules and securities
laws has taken place.
Exchanges have two possible options to monitor the
market, despite fragmentation. First, they might monitor other
exchanges and dark pools to overcome information deficits.
Exchanges might seek out information from other venues on
traders, carefully scrutinize post-trade prices, or observe
unusual trading on their own platforms that might connect
with information from other venues.
Though appealing, this option is likely too-time-andresource-consuming to be feasible.
Exchanges must
investigate any number of dark pools and other exchanges.
The costs of investigations will be high. Exchanges would have
to police volumes of trading outside of their own venue. With
information limited as a result of a lack of pre-trade and posttrade transparency at dark pools, these investigation costs will

209 Matthew Coupe, Dark Pools Need Clampdown, FIN. TIMES, (Apr. 5, 2013),
https://www.ft.com/content/1111cb44-9144-11e2-b839-00144feabdc0
[https://perma.cc/H4BR-NB3L].
210 Recall that dark pools do not contribute to price discovery but utilize the
exchange price to benchmark prices on the dark pool. For a study on
manipulative techniques between a crossing network and an exchange, see Mao
Ye, Price Manipulation, Price Discovery and Transaction Costs in the Crossing
Network 3–4 (Working Paper, 2012).
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likely be too high for any one exchange to wish to internalize
privately.211
Exchanges could also police individual traders more
diligently.
Such intensive oversight would rest on the
assumption that exchanges and dark pools are home to a
common population of traders that are simply moving from one
venue to the next. By controlling the conduct and institutional
characteristics of those that come to trade on their venue,
exchanges can create externalities that benefit the system as a
whole. By forcing traders to behave better on their exchange,
exchanges can ensure that the market generally becomes a
place for safer traders.
Even here, the solution breaks down. Emerging studies
suggest that the investor populations of dark pools versus lit
exchanges often diverge. Even though informed traders can be
motivated to use dark pools to maximize the secrecy of their
information, studies caution against simply assuming that
dark pools comprise cohorts of informed traders. Interestingly,
informed traders can face a number of problems when trading
in a dark pool. If they are all informed about Public Company’s
real value, they may all trade similarly and in one direction.
This group thus needs a variety of traders including
uninformed traders against which they can make money.212
Dark pools consisting largely of informed traders are thus
unlikely to do well. The risks of non-execution or overly
expensive execution will be too high. Moreover, liquidity
suppliers (market makers) will be reluctant to transact on a
venue filled with informed traders.
Market makers will
predictably lose in such an environment, as informed traders
win consistently.213
Instead, studies suggest that dark pools are, in fact,
populated more heavily by uninformed traders rather than
informed ones. As Professor Haoxiang Zhu observes, dark
pools can be more attractive to uninformed traders. Ironically,
as an indirect effect, this means that public exchanges can end
up more informed, because savvy investors are drawn to
211 The Nasdaq is seeking to develop dark pool surveillance. N ASDAQ, SMARTS
TRADE
SURVEILLANCE
FOR
DARK
POOLS,
https://business.nasdaq.com/tech/surveillance/surveillancesolutions/smarts-dark-pools/index.html [https://perma.cc/938K-QS8V].
212 See Andre Perold, The Implementation Shortfall: Paper v. Reality, 14 J.
PORTFOLIO MGMT. 4 (2008); Robert Engle & Robert Ferstenberg, Execution Risk
(Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12165, 2006).
213 Glosten & Milgrom, supra note 20 (noting that dealers transact as
uninformed traders).
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exchanges owing to the availability of more reliable execution.
Relatedly, finance theory suggests that market makers will
move to venues with a higher population of uninformed
investors in order to make money. Dark pools, should
therefore be attractive to market makers that benefit by trading
against more uninformed traders.214
This leaves exchanges in a difficult position in their effort
to monitor traders. The population of traders may not always
be constant or common between dark pools and exchanges.
Uninformed traders may congregate more frequently on dark
pools or may be more willing to shift their business to dark
pools from exchanges if this suits a particular strategy (e.g.,
the need to trade secretly). It cannot just be assumed that
exchanges will see a steady and common pool of traders that
can be scrutinized and whose activities can be controlled
effectively.
Furthermore, even if discipline is exercised by an exchange
against a Trader—for example, if an exchange demands that a
Trader keep more capital—this discipline may be insufficiently
demanding to reflect the risk the Trader takes. Without fully
knowing what traders are doing on other venues, exchanges
may inefficiently “price” the risk that the uninformed trader
creates. Even if the uninformed trader keeps more capital to
reflect the risks it takes on the exchange, it may not be keeping
enough capital to also reflect risks it also takes on the dark
pool and the exchange. If the uninformed trader is splitting its
orders between an exchange and a dark pool, it can create
common risks and fail to pay for this conduct. If the exchange
asks for better reporting of the trades, it cannot easily verify
the veracity of this information without a robust knowledge of
trading on the various dark pools in operation.
C. Underinvestment in Oversight
Regulation splits oversight responsibilities unevenly
between exchanges and dark pools. Exchanges are subject to
Section 6 of the Exchange Act; dark pools are not.215 This

214 This reflects the “cream-skimming” hypothesis, whereby off-exchange
market-makers “skim off” uninformed traders and make money by trading with
these actors. For an early discussion and comparison between the NYSE/NASD,
see Henrik Bessembinder & Herbert M. Kaufman, A Cross-Exchange Comparison
of Execution Costs and Information Flow of NYSE Stocks, 46 J. FIN. ECON. 293,
295–96 (1997) (finding evidence of cream skimming by off-exchange marketmakers of uninformed traders).
215 17 CFR § 242.301(b)(3).
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asymmetry places a relatively higher compliance cost on
exchanges. Because exchanges are subject to this mandate,
they should be motivated to contact other exchanges and dark
pools and to cooperate in the exercise of oversight.
However, this may not necessarily be the case. In the
National Market, interconnected venues compete for business,
such that venues can gain from taking risks for private gain
because the fuller costs of this risk-taking are borne by and
shared between other venues. Venues stand to benefit by
investing minimum resources in oversight, as the costs of
failure can be externalized to the system of exchanges and dark
pools.
For a start, exchanges have little incentive to exceed a
minimum level of investment, not going beyond what is
sufficient to police users on their own venues. Investing to
bridge the gaps in oversight left by other venues is wasteful
from the perspective of their own profits. By going beyond
what the exchange needs to do to keep its own venue safe, it
confers value on its competitors. Other venues enjoy the
benefit of safer traders and can attract business by the promise
of cheaper services (because they can freeride off a diligent
exchange’s efforts). Externalizing such benefits to other
venues is harmful to an exchange. Not only does it allow a
competitor venue to free ride on the exchange’s investment,
but it can also encourage a competitor to exercise less than
optimal oversight on its own venue. A competitor venue—
relying on an exchange to do the hard work—has every
incentive to under-invest in monitoring. Exchanges can thus
be wary of allocating excess resources to general oversight.
Doing so risks enriching competitors and encourages these
competitors to take more risks, knowing that hard-working
exchanges are picking up the tab.
But do exchanges have incentives to do even less than the
minimum desirable to secure their institution? On the one
hand, it is clear that exchanges and dark pools face costly
consequences when they fail in the exercise of good
governance. The SEC fined the Chicago Board Options
Exchange for falling short in the performance of its duties as a
market regulator.216 The CME faced enormous reputational
damage following its failure to catch the mismanagement of
216 Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Charges CBOE
for
Regulatory
Failures
(June
11,
2013),
https://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/136517157534
8 [http://perma.cc/8NXJ-9UE5].
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client money at MF Global. And, the various glitches and
malfunctions afflicting exchanges—like the Nasdaq and NYSE
outages—have cast doubt on their robustness to offer a
credible platform on which to transact.
However, interconnection and fragmentation can create
incentives towards taking risks and cutting corners even in
providing a minimum level of oversight. First, interconnection
means that exchanges and dark pools can never be completely
immune from a crisis on their platform even if they have taken
all reasonable precautions to protect themselves. In the
National Market, exchanges and dark pools are intricately
connected through transactional and informational links, such
that traders and data can travel easily from one venue to the
next. Scholars have remarked on the fast flow of information
between venues, bringing high-speed efficiency to markets—
but also enormous vulnerability to errors moving rapidly from
one platform to another.217 This means that errors on an
exchange or dark pool can spread to other venues, creating
costs that can quickly move beyond the confines of a single
trading platform.218
If an exchange does not internalize the full consequences
of its risk taking, it can have fewer incentives to invest in
overseeing problem behavior on its own platform. Unlike
consolidated markets, when an exchange might expect to
suffer deeply in case of its own regulatory failure,
fragmentation can shift a portion of these costs to another
exchange or dark pool. With risks moving easily to another
venue, an exchange has a few options when deciding how
much to invest in regulatory oversight: (i) it can invest heavily
in ensuring that its venue is aggressively policed, to maintain
its own safety as well as that of other venues; (ii) it can invest
just enough to ensure that its venue remains safe, but allowing
risky behavior that externalizes costs to another venue; or (iii)
it can under-invest in oversight because risky behavior can
generate profit. It does not internalize the full cost of risktaking as costs are also borne by other venues. And risks from
other venues can migrate to the exchange despite the
exchange’s efforts to secure the exchange.
Option 1: An exchange has little motivation to invest
Gerig, supra note 35.
For the SEC’s inquest into the convulsive markets of August 24, 2015,
which failed to offer any conclusive opinion on the causes of the causes of the
turbulence, see Securities and Exchange Commission, Equity Market Volatility on
August 24, 2015, Research Note, 2–6 (Dec. 2015).
217
218
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aggressively in oversight to control risks to itself and to others.
As discussed above, doing so essentially transfers value from
the exchange to a competitor.
Option 2: This option is problematic for an exchange.
While it seems appealing for an exchange to just focus on
protecting its own venue, implementing this goal is harder
than it sounds. Unless exchanges can actually control traders
and force them to trade only on their venue (rather than also
on dark pools), simply focusing on policing a single venue is
near impossible in fluid, fragmented markets.
If an exchange wishes to police risks on its venue,
fragmentation and interconnection in market design means
that it must also engage in some monitoring and disciplining
of risks that traders create on other venues. As above, this
means that exchanges must invest in gathering information
more fully and understanding the behavior of traders on other
venues (e.g., are they splitting orders between the exchange
and a dark pool?). This approach can confer benefit to
competitors, as described above. It means investing time and
money where the gains are uncertain (and potentially reaped
by others).
Option 3: This option benefits exchanges charged to
perform expensive oversight. Indeed, it represents a rational
allocation of an exchange’s regulatory resources. Exchanges
that invest even in minimal oversight of their own venue can
confer a benefit to a competing exchange. Robust oversight
benefits others and undermines an exchange’s profitability.
Underinvestment in discipline is more rational. For one, lax
oversight boosts profitability. It reduces the transaction costs
a venue faces. It can also encourage volume to come to an
exchange.
Fragmented markets can encourage greater risk-taking by
an exchange because it does not fully internalize the costs of
its own bad oversight. Risks spread fluidly. A disruptive trader
can cause problems across multiple venues.
Indeed, precisely because the costs of risks can be
externalized to the market as a whole, single exchanges can
harbor powerful incentives to take on larger risks than they
might otherwise have done in a consolidated market. Such
risky behavior might manifest in different ways. Exchanges
might be motivated to give traders wide latitude as a means of
competing for and attracting their business. This might
include not only opportunities to transact riskily on the
exchange but also lax enforcement for breaches. For example,
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exchanges routinely try to attract high-volume traders by the
promise of rebates for their business even if the liquidity they
provide may be transient and contingent on continued
payment of these rebates.
To maintain their business,
exchanges can give such traders latitude in how they transact,
such as through the availability of different types of orders that
can help them trade flexibly and get ahead of others.219
Dependence on such traders for liquidity can discourage
exchanges from adopting too aggressive a posture vis-à-vis
discipline.
In any event, the costs of regulatory failure are not borne
by the exchange alone. With the National Market connecting
venues to one another, a disruption on the exchange (e.g., a
disappearance of liquidity that leads to a crash in prices) will
likely reverberate across the system. A technological glitch
may create ripples across multiple exchanges and dark pools,
requiring these other venues to take steps to protect
themselves. An exchange has limited incentives to foresee and
provision for these system-wide risks ex ante.
Finally, underinvestment in regulation can be a rational
strategy if an exchange or dark pool is inherently vulnerable to
costs created by other venues in the National Market.
Exchanges create costs for others through sub-optimal
regulation. They can also be subject to disruption resulting
from another’s failure to invest in oversight.
It may not always be possible to determine where and how
these risks might materialize. In a market comprising a large
number of “dark” venues, investigating and curing
informational deficits can be too costly for any one venue to do
by itself. Even with transparency, interconnection between
venues can result in harms that may grow in seriousness as
they proliferate across the different venues.
This
interdependence and vulnerability to unpredictable risks can
encourage a sub-optimally lax approach to oversight. If they
know they can get in trouble because of someone else’s bad
oversight—and pay out for someone else’s mistakes—it makes
sense for exchanges to also take profitable risks that might

219 Massoudi & Mackenzie, supra note 167 (noting the rise of order types and
rebates designed to capture business from dark pools). It is worth noting that
ATSs too can offer a range of order types to help ATSs to compete and attract
traders. For discussion, see Stanislav Dolgopolov, High-Frequency Trading, Order
Types, and the Evolution of the Securities Market Structure: One Whistleblower’s
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 2014 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y. 145,
148–49 (2014).
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impose some external costs on others. Otherwise, careful
exchanges are simply absorbing the costs of others, without
any real pay-off for themselves. Diligent exchanges face a
doubly bad outcome. For one, they are left holding the can, as
other venues take risks, make money, win business and
perpetuate problems. But, their costs of doing business are
also likely to be higher. While others capture business because
of their lower transaction costs, diligent exchanges come out
looking like expensive propositions. In a market where trading
services are fungible and designed to be captured by the
cheapest venue, a diligent exchange gets little reward for its
efforts.
With unpredictable risks and fragmentation, venues
collectively face two broad choices: (i) to agree to invest heavily
in oversight as a means of protecting themselves and each
other; or (ii) to take risks, compete and profit—even if the costs
are borne by the system from time to time. With dark pools
subject to much lighter regulatory obligations relative to
exchanges, the first option is clearly moot. This leaves
exchanges and dark pools to compete and take risks, with the
costs periodically externalized and absorbed by the system as
a whole in an ad hoc manner. Sometimes, this institutional
risk sharing can be beneficial. This was clear in the response
of the market to the summer 2015 NYSE outage, as trading
diverted smoothly to other venues. But, it is also concerning.
Venues can be subject to disruptive risks, impacting not just
trading but also the credibility of the system as a whole.
In summary, fragmentation in market design diminishes
the capacity of exchanges to exercise effective oversight. This
Article raises three areas of concern. First, fragmentation
reduces the resources and reach of exchanges to oversee and
discipline traders. Competition with cheaper, less transparent
venues has placed exchanges on the back foot, losing profit
and power to newer upstarts. With choosier customers,
exchanges face information asymmetries and possess limited
resources with which to overcome these deficits. Secondly,
these informational deficits matter because fragmented
markets make them especially costly to manage. If exchanges
are supposed to provide frontline oversight, pervasive
informational gaps should constitute a major source of
concern. Yet, with dark pools capturing large volumes of
business and promising reduced transparency, these gaps are
pervasive and near impossible for any single exchange to
bridge cost-effectively. Thirdly, interconnected, fragmented
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venues have little incentive to invest in policing or to
collectively come together to oversee the market. Rather, they
can privately benefit through under-investment.
An
interconnected national market encourages venues to take
risks in the provision of oversight, garnering high private gains
but shifting the fuller costs of their indiscipline to others in the
market.
IV
THE CASE FOR LIABILITY IN MARKET DESIGN
The failure of exchange oversight and the private selfregulation it represents creates systematic costs for the
efficient allocation of capital. If exchanges cannot fulfill their
statutory mandate to police traders and public companies, the
market loses a powerful source of discipline. To be sure, forprofit exchanges have long been problematic overseers,
perceived as divided in their loyalty between their own profit
margins and their duty to public good. Despite these concerns,
however, law and regulation continue to entrust them with
enormous power to supervise the flow of risk capital in the
economy. As shown here, fragmentation in market design
makes achieving this statutory mandate close to impossible
practically
This Part outlines a proposal to cure this deficit. As a
starting point, it examines the workability of returning markets
to a more consolidated structure comprising just a small
handful of venues and suggests that this solution is unlikely
to be successful.
In the absence of consolidation, this Part advocates for
expanding liability for exchanges and dark pools and holding
them more directly liable for their failures in oversight. This
means removing the cover of qualified immunity for exchanges
that has allowed them to have wide latitude in the quality of
oversight they have provided. The goal of this proposal, one
that builds on my earlier writings, seeks to force exchanges
(and dark pools) to focus more explicitly on their
responsibilities as market monitors. My earlier writings
sought to hold trading venues more fully liable for disruptions
arising on account of automated trading practices. I build on
earlier work by suggesting that the likelihood of error and
disruption is amplified by ineffective oversight in fragmented
markets.
Stronger liability can help offset the negative
incentives afflicting venues to be lax in monitoring and
enforcement. Finally, building on prior work, this Article re-
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emphasizes the benefits of exchanges and dark pools
contributing to a shared fund to pay out on liability claims
when a single exchanges or dark pool cannot. In building
mutual contribution to a compensatory fund, the proposal
encourages peer monitoring between venues to hold each other
accountable for their failings in oversight.220
A. A Return to Consolidation?
The costs of fragmentation might suggest that policy has
got things badly wrong in the last two decades. Fragmentation
erodes the major structural advantages that exchanges
possess when exercising oversight, like network externalities
and deep informational reserves on traders. A proliferation of
dark pools—permitted to transact without the usual
compliance burdens that exchanges face—siphons off both
high volumes of traders as well as information on them. The
threat of exclusion is also rendered much less powerful.221
Exchanges are forced to work harder on a tighter budget to fill
these gaps, leaving investors exposed to higher risks if
exchanges’ for-profit motivations take precedence over the
public good.
At first blush, this predicament points to the benefits of
pivoting back to the tried-and-tested model of consolidating
trading venues into a handful of institutions. Regulation ATS
permits a plethora of non-exchange trading venues to thrive on
account of lower entry and operating standards. From the
structural standpoint, then, one response points to the need
to re-think Regulation ATS and whether non-exchange trading
venues ought to become subject to much higher entry
standards than are currently in operation.
Heightened
regulatory standards would increase the costs of business that
any ATS confronts. ATS are unlikely to withstand the twin
challenges of acquiring trading volume and ensuring that
users get cheap, high-quality services at the same time. In a
higher compliance environment, ATS may struggle to develop
the networks necessary to sustain trading volume and the
quality of services provision to influence trader preferences.
To be sure, regulators have outlined possible reforms to
220 This Part builds on my writings in Yadav, Liability, supra note 34. Liability
proposes stronger liability levers for exchanges in the context of risks created by
algorithmic trading and the failure of traditional liability standards to effectively
constrain and punish traders for their errors, negligence and fraud in algorithmic
trading.
221 See, e.g., Kwan, Masulis & McInish, supra note 180.
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tighten demands on ATS. For example, the SEC requires ATS
to disclose a much larger reserve of institutional information
about their operations than prior rules have demanded.
Whereas previously, ATS could get away with providing
“rudimentary” information (in the SEC’s own words), reforms
mandate that ATS offer up more details about how they are
run, who uses them, special services, any rebate
arrangements, side-relationships between an ATS and any
other affiliate or organization, and so on.222 Such reforms seem
well designed to cut down on the kind of abuses perpetuated
by Barclays, for example, a firm that promised its users with a
dark pool free of aggressive HFT traders, but failed to deliver.223
But these reforms do not challenge the fundamental notion
of off-exchange trading and the essential place of ATS as
venues designed to facilitate competition. Also, these reforms
do not attack the basic lack of transparency underlying dark
pool operations: low-volume venues still do not need to publish
information on available quotes. Showing that regulation
wishes to maintain a place for dark pools as a competitor to
traditional exchanges, the SEC’s new rules do not change the
core premise of dark pools as venues offering investors a
lightly-regulated, less open and often cheaper proposition for
trading business.
In many ways, a return to consolidation offers a compelling
solution to the costs of fragmentation. It is also one familiar to
the market. But any reform designed to radically return
markets to their state of consolidation—as an answer to the
problem of sub-optimal exchange oversight—must reckon with
the fuller trade-offs this imposes on a market structure now
accustomed to fragmented trading.
For a start, securities regulation seeks to achieve a number
of goals. As part of its mission, the SEC aims to protect
investors, maintain fair and orderly markets and enable better
capital formation.224 A consolidated market could well offer the
best model to achieve these goals. However, it is not obvious
that this will always be the case or be accepted as such by
scholars, policymakers and investors. Consolidation, too, can
have drawbacks. In particular, scholars remain divided as to
whether a consolidated market structure necessarily delivers

See Rule 304 Reg ATS, 17 C.F.R. § 242.304; Burns et al., supra note 153.
See supra subsections II.A–B.
224 See
Securities
and
Exchange
Commission,
What
We
Do,
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml [http://perma.cc/W737-HE4T].
222
223
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the most optimal efficiencies and trading outcomes. As
discussed in Part I, they observe that investors continue to
seek out opportunities to trade on other venues,
notwithstanding the dominance of major exchanges and their
network benefits. That is, even in consolidated markets,
investors have, to varying degrees, always exercised some
choice to transact outside of an exchange.225 In looking to curb
use of ATS, policy must first determine whether preserving
investor choice in market design remains a goal worth
pursuing. A few issues are worth considering. First, one might
question whether investors will accept a reversion back to the
days when the NYSE and Nasdaq dominated almost all trading
and listing. Dark pools have succeeded precisely because they
appear to have provided investors with services that they could
not find or did not wish to pay for in the lit public market.
While the lack of transparency is rightly concerning from the
point of view of oversight, it clearly holds appeal for investors,
driving volume and continuing interest in dark pools. Besides
the offer of opacity, dark pools can also be cheaper, promising
lower fees public exchanges. Having enjoyed this smorgasbord
of choice, it is at least questionable whether investors will
readily accept a return to a more rigid design. Indeed,
Professor Larry Harris suggests that policy should not
necessarily fix on consolidation as self-evident, given varied
investor preferences and the chance that consolidation may
end up being the wrong pick.226
Concretely, scholars have drawn mixed conclusions about
impact of dark pools on key metrics of market quality like price
efficiency. While a full discussion of this issue is outside the
scope of the Article, opinions about whether dark pools are
beneficial or harmful show deep divisions in opinion. A
number of scholars point to the benefits of dark pools for
market quality. For instance, scholars point to the tendency
of dark pools to absorb more uninformed traders into their
venue as a positive. Public markets may end up better
informed as a result.227 Dark pools can also help institutions
dispose of large blocks of shares without disrupting markets

225 See O’Hara & Ye, supra note 12 (for a literature review); Madhavan, supra
note 22. As Professors Garabade and Silber note, even in consolidated markets
with some competing venues, price discovery tends to happen in the larger,
consolidated exchanges. Garbade & Silber, supra note 74.
226 See Lawrence E. Harris, Consolidation, Fragmentation, Segmentation and
Regulation, 2 FIN. MKTS. INSTITUTIONS & I NSTRUMENTS 1, 4–10 (1993).
227 See, e.g., Zhu, supra note 168.
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or immediately disclosing investor intent.228 At the same time,
others express reserve, pointing out, for example, that
excessive fragmentation in markets can damage liquidity on lit
exchanges.229 In all, firm assessments of the merits of dark
pools vs. exchanges are elusive, viewed at least from the
perspective of empirical finance scholarship.
These uncertainties create complex trade-offs for
proposals to return to a more consolidated market. This Article
demonstrates the enormous challenges—and costs—that
fragmentation creates for market oversight. Taken broadly,
some may suggest that these costs are offset by the gains for
investor choice, or the possible benefits that dark pools provide
for market quality.
Combined with path dependencies
generated over the two decades during which investors have
enjoyed greater choice, a dramatic about-turn towards
consolidation starts to look unfeasible.
B. A Case for Liability
Short of structural consolidation, trading venues can be
pushed towards better oversight by a stronger threat of legal
liability and a collective liability between exchanges and dark
pools for market-wide harms. Historically, exchanges have
enjoyed wide immunity from liability in the performance of
their regulatory functions—a qualified immunity in return for
performing the public good of policing.230
The critical importance of exchanges, however, means that
their failings can carry high financial and expressive
consequence. A systematic degree of error, misinformation
and fraud can impact the value of securities and leave
investors and public companies to bear the costs of an
exchange’s poor oversight—hurting capital allocation.
Investors-at-large and public companies are generally
inefficient monitors and cannot be relied on to internalize the
costs of exchanges falling short in their statutory oversight
228 See Peter Gomber et al., Competition Between Equity Markets: Evidence
from the Consolidation Versus Fragmentation Debate, 31 J. ECON. SURVS. 3, 802
(2017).
229 See Kwan, Masulis, McInish, supra note 180, at 6–7 (discussing mixed
conclusions).
230 See Sparta Surgical Corp. v. NASD, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1213 (9th Cir.
1998); Barbara v. New York Stock Exchange, No. 631, Docket 95-7471 (2d Cir.
1996). But see Weissman v. NASD, Inc. (Weissman IV), 500 F.3d 1293, 1299
(11th Cir. 2007). See generally, Craig Springer, Weissman v. NASD: Piercing the
Veil of Absolute Immunity of an SRO under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
33 DEL. J. C ORP. L., 465 (2008) (discussing exculpating Nasdaq from liability).
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duty. Moreover, statute is clear in giving exchanges an
expansive role in oversight. While consolidated exchanges
might have had advantages, fragmentation does not absolve
them of this role. However, fragmentation does raise structural
challenges to the exercise of oversight. In the absence of
consolidation, it follows that the application of the statutory
mandate must now adapt to the reality of fragmented markets.
Liability for Trading Venues: This Article shows that
oversight is undermined in three key ways: (i) exchanges carry
the main weight of liability relative to dark pools, but see an
ever-diminishing fraction of trading volume. With less money
and fewer traders, oversight is compromised; (ii) exchanges
cannot effectively monitor other venues; and (iii) the National
Market creates incentives for venues to privately profit from
risks at a cost to the system has a whole.
This analysis points to the desirability of moving to a
framework in which exchanges and dark pools are able to: (i)
better internalize the costs of sub-optimal governance; and (ii)
develop incentives to monitor each other alongside systematic
tools that facilitate this self-policing.
Risk sharing between exchanges and ATS points to the
desirability of imposing liability for oversight failures on both
dark pools as well as on exchanges.231 This necessitates
grounding this liability within the context of a broader duty to
police markets, applying not only to exchanges but also to dark
pools. While dark pools might continue to benefit from
regulatory leeway (e.g., in the lack of transparency), enlarging
the scope of the oversight mandate to cover dark pools as well
as exchanges makes sense from the policy standpoint. Dark
pools host traders in the same National Market securities as
exchanges. Moreover, risks can spread from dark pools to
exchanges (and vice versa) given common informational and
logistical connections. A marked asymmetry in the policing
burden carried by exchanges and dark pools thus appears
formalistic. Just as exchanges are required to ensure that they
assure compliance with securities laws and prevent fraud and
manipulation, similar requirements ought to be expressly
extended to dark pools. Regulators have proposed measures
requiring dark pools to disclose more about detail about their
operations. It seems fitting to also deepen their role in
oversight as a means of ensuring that dark pools pre-commit
to a basic standard of organizational form, leaving venues free
231

See Yadav, Liability, supra note 34.
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to compete on other services. This might mean, for example,
that dark pools also ensure compliance with securities laws,
particularly as these relate to fraud, manipulation and insider
trading. Given the lack of transparency on dark pools, an
explicit assumption of legal duty to prevent misbehavior and
misconduct can offset the risks of traders utilizing dark pools
for supervisory arbitrage and deceptive behavior. In addition,
dark pools might vet those that utilize their venue more
strictly. Differing entry standards between dark pools and
exchanges encourage less qualified traders to utilize dark pools
for potentially risky trading. If dark pools do not wish to invest
in vetting traders, they might instead rely on existing
exchanges to certify traders and for this certification to then
qualify traders to transact freely across dark pools.
Rather than giving trading venues latitude and immunity,
as the law has done the risks from competing venues point
towards the benefits of imposing liability in case of oversight
failures by trading platforms. The scope of this liability is set
to be deliberately broad. In past work, I have suggested that
exchanges be held secondarily liable, on a liability basis, for
instances of error, negligence or fraud occurring in automated
markets, where the trader causing this harm is unable to cover
the losses. In other words, exchanges stand ready to cover the
shortfall in cases where traders are unable to pay for the
damage they cause on their venue. In addition, and in some
instances separately, liability may be imposed for instances
where exchanges have fallen short in their exercise of their
oversight functions and caused losses for investors in the
market.
First, an ex post compensation mechanism aims to foster
better ex ante incentives for exchanges and dark pools to be
rigorous in oversight. Venues may be to blame in cases where
traders cause large losses.
When traders make costly
mistakes—so large that they cannot pay for it themselves—
exchange/dark pool oversight failures are likely to blame. Why
was a trader permitted to take on risks that for which she could
not adequately provision? Why were these risks able to
materialize in a systemically damaging and costly manner?
Why did monitoring mechanisms fail to detect instances of
egregious trader misbehavior? To the extent that exchanges
and dark pools have their own pocketbooks on the line, one
might expect them to attack instances of misbehavior more
forcefully ex ante.
But exchanges may be separately liable for sub-optimal
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oversight of markets—unconnected to harm caused by traders.
This might happen, for example, if exchanges install poor
quality infrastructure, if they put their own business interests
conspicuously ahead of the public good (e.g., CBOE) or if the
failure to co-ordinate between venues contributes to deeper,
more damaging harms to the market. Put more simply,
exchanges and dark pools should be seen to have, and actually
have, a tangible stake in market oversight. This should
improve market monitoring as well as encourage greater
confidence on the part of regulators and investors in the ability
of trading venues to fulfill their statutory mandate.
Secondly, the threat of ex post liability can reduce the
incentives of exchanges and dark pools to take profitable risks
at the expense of the market system. Venues may be willing
to overlook instances of misbehavior on their platforms to
attract volume, lowering transaction costs for themselves and
building a profitable user base. In this context, the threat of
liability for a dark pools and exchange can provide a corrective
to these distorted incentives. By imposing costs on any
motivation to riskily oversee the market, liability levers can
reduce the inclination of trading venues to extract private
benefit at a cost to the market as a whole.
Collective Liability and Monitoring: In earlier work
referenced above, I proposed establishing a Market Disruption
Fund, representing a shared fund financed by exchanges to
help defray the costs of damage in cases where a single
exchange cannot pay out.232 Underlying this proposal is the
concern that a single venue may not always have the resources
to pay out on a large claim in an interconnected market. A
problem might start on one exchange or dark pools and then
mushroom across several venues, leading to a large claim. If
the liability regime underlying market structure lacks
resources, it lacks the credibility to constrain bad actors or to
assure investors about the protective potential of exchange
oversight. In seeking to encourage better collective monitoring
and oversight, such a Fund ought to include contributions by
dark pools and exchanges.
This Fund can support losses caused by failures of
oversight by exchanges and dark pools. The design would
fulfill three key criteria: (i) compensate investors that lose on
account of a failure by an exchange or dark pools to meet its
oversight responsibilities; (ii) reduce bad incentives on the part
232

See Yadav, Liability, supra note 34.
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of exchanges or dark pools to take risks knowing that the Fund
is available to pay out on a claim; and (iii) force exchanges and
dark pools to actively monitor each other as a means of private
discipline.
With respect to (i) and (ii) above, a Fund might require that
all venues participating in the trading of NMS securities
contribute to its reserve in accordance with a set of established
criteria (e.g., by proportion of equity volume, past record of
good oversight). In the event of a covered loss, the Fund can
pay out to an aggrieved investor or other party, first dipping
into the reserves of any trader that is misbehaving and then
the main venue where the bad trader was active before then
using up contributions by other venues. If one or more venues
are implicated, the Fund can assess joint liability for more than
one venue.
Importantly, to reduce moral hazard on the part of venues,
caused because venues gain the support of an industry wide
disruption fund, payments will first be made by the most
culpable venue. To the extent these venues are not wiped out
by liability, the Fund may require them to pay in extra funds
after the fact in acknowledgement of their deficiency. Much
like tried-and-tested mechanisms in insurance, the Fund
represents a mechanism for the market to protect itself against
risk, to make good on any losses and to reduce the chances of
bad actors to behave disruptively owing to this backstop.
Importantly, with respect to (iii), such a Fund would create
an institutional mechanism to incentivize venues to better
police one another. This Article shows that exchanges and
dark pools cannot easily verify that others are conducting
oversight effectively. A shared liability fund can motivate
exchanges and dark pools to better oversee each other’s
conduct. An industry fund should also provide an institutional
locus of common interests. It can push venues to cooperate in
the exercise of market oversight, to share information and pool
monitoring resources. Underlying this motivation is the
expectation that industry self-policing can help to discover and
root out weak links in the National Market. Institutions that
cannot contribute to the Fund or those that show up as
responsible for repeated failures ought to see reputational
sanction as well as industry discipline, designed to eventually
price them out of the market (e.g. through individual liability,
higher contributions to the Fund/sanction by public
regulators). To some extent, an example of some institutional
cooperation is offered by FINRA, the industry self-regulator.
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However, without skin-in-the-game through private liability
and financial interdependence through shared liability,
incentives to exercise industry self-monitoring and discipline
are too weak to be workable. In this absence, the market
cannot continue to rely on exchange oversight as a central
pillar of the regulation.
CONCLUSION
By statute, exchanges are tasked with overseeing
securities markets and assuring compliance with applicable
laws and industry standards. With policy favoring competition
in the delivery of trading services, however, recent years have
seen heavy fragmentation in market structure, characterized
by a proliferation of exchanges as well as lightly regulated dark
pools. While fragmentation offers investors choice in how to
trade as well as reduced transaction costs, it has also rendered
it near impossible, in practice, for exchanges to oversee the
marketplace. Lower trading revenues, fierce competition and
incentives to take profitable risks have severely diminished the
capacity of exchanges to fulfill their supervisory duty. This
Article takes a first step to restore the efficacy of exchange
oversight and to better realize the goals of statute. In
proposing a new liability regime for trading venues, it re-frames
the cost-benefit trade-off that platforms face when calibrating
the intensity of oversight. By ensuring that there is a real cost
for venues that neglect good governance, liability can help align
private incentives towards the public good. In so doing,
oversight failure in securities markets can be confronted and
controlled, ensuring gains for investor protection and efficient
capital allocation in the marketplace.
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